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Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a threat to the
national interests of the United States affect virtually
every aspect of American policy. Differing assessments of
the threat necessarily require different policy responses.
It is important to understand the range of differing assess-
ments in order to support a coherent American foreign
policy.
This study identifies and explicates the components of a
threat assessment in order to categorize different images of
the Soviet threat. Four different images are examined, two
of which appear to change over time. Finally, changes in
liberal and conservative assessments of the Soviet threat in
Africa from 1975-1985 are detailed in order to demonstrate
that changing assessments are directly related to the core
elements of each image.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Beliefs about the nature of the "Soviet threat" affect
virtually every aspect of American policy. American images
of this threat, however, vary widely. The particular image
which is held by policy makers will influence, if not
determine, their policy preferences. For this reason, it is
important to understand the nature and full range of
alternative images of the Soviet threat that guide U.S.
foreign policy elites.
Each image of the Soviet threat has a characteristic set
of components. By identifying these components, it is
possible to differentiate competing images. This study
seeks to identify the core components of alternative images
and analyze the ways in which particular images have
influenced and been influenced by, perceptions of African
developments
.
Images of the Soviet threat are a complex blend of many
attitudes and beliefs. Four images, each representing a
different mix of general beliefs and particular attitudes,
can be identified. These four images can be labeled: (1)
alarmist; (2) conservative; (3) liberal; and (4) apologist.
Each of these images represents an "ideal type" which is
only approximated in reality. The actual images which guide
policymakers are not as simple and distinct as these four
images. Constructing ideal types, however, makes it
possible to differentiate alternative images and, hence,
order the debate over the Soviet threat. Because the
apologist position is not represented in the current U.S.
debate over policy toward the Third World, it is not
considered in this study. Chapter three outlines the other
three positions, along with a sub-category, the confident
liberal. As will be demonstrated, only two of these images,
the conservative and the liberal, are dynamic, changing
their assessment of the Soviet threat in response to events
in the Third World. For practical reasons, this study
focuses on assessments of the Soviet threat in Africa from
1975 to 1985. Although any image of the Soviet threat
contains an inherent set of implications for U.S. policy,
these implications will not be detailed, nor will any
particular image be supported or rebutted by the author.
II. SOURCES
This monograph is not intended to be an exhaustive
survey of all literature relating to the perceptions of the
Soviet threat. However, a serious attempt has been made to
review the work of many individuals who are representative
of the major threat assessment categories. Numerous books
were invaluable; certainly too many to mention here.
However, as is evident in the body of this paper, William
Welch's American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy (1970)
provides a useful framework from which to begin any work of
this kind. Special mention must also be made of the work
done on the operationalization of belief systems by Dr. Ole
R. Holsti of Duke University.
Insights into the complex issues which faced the various
US administrations during these times were provided by the
memoirs of Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew
Brzezinski, among others.
Finally, the substance and tone of well-informed
"popular" opinion was gleaned from editorial pieces




and The New York Times over the ten year period under
examination. Regardless of the official editorial stances
taken by these newspapers, a variety of individual positions
were printed by each, providing a wealth of short, concise
statements of various assessments.
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III. IMAGES OF THE SOVIET THREAT
The purpose of this work is to trace American
assessments of the Soviet threat in Africa over a period of
time. This initially requires a means of categorizing
different assessments. By examining the major components of
each assessment images can be distinguished from one
another.
Images contain two basic types of beliefs: beliefs
about the internal forces underlying Soviet foreign policy,
and beliefs about external influences on Soviet foreign
policy. Internal factors include beliefs about: (1) Soviet
goals; (2) the sources of those goals; (3) how those goals
are pursued; and (4) how foreign policy decisions are made
in the U.S.S.R. External factors include beliefs about:
(1) the nature and structure of the international system;
and (2) the character of the Third World.
Beliefs about the nature of Soviet goals are the
cornerstones of any image of the Soviet threat. Such
beliefs range from those of the alarmists, who believe
Soviet policy makers are guided by long-range grand designs
for world domination, to some liberals who see the Soviets
as primarily defensive. Conservatives and most liberals
generally agree that the Soviet Union is expansionist, but
disagree on the motives behind its expansionism and the
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degree to which that expansionism may be limited by other
nondispositional factors. Beliefs about the underlying
sources or determinants of Soviet goals are also an
important element in any categorization of images of the
Soviet threat.
Means of pursuit are the ways in which the Soviet Union
attempts to achieve its goals. Beliefs about these means of
pursuit relate directly to beliefs about Soviet goals.
Alarmist beliefs about the nature of Soviet goals tend to be
supplemented by images of single-minded and harsh means.
Conversely, softer views of Soviet goals tend to be
associated with more nuanced, mixed images of Soviet means.
Beliefs about the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Soviet decision-making machinery also color overall images
of the Soviet threat. Beliefs about this component are
again consistent with images of the other components. While
the alarmist tends to see the decision-making apparatus as
powerful and unconstrained, softer images tend to recognize
bureaucratic and organizational constraints.
Beliefs about the nature of the contemporary
international system obviously affect images of the Soviet
threat. Whether one believes the international system is
tightly polarized or somewhat pluralistic, for example, will
significantly influence one's assessments of Soviet actions.
Perceptions of the Soviet threat in Africa are also
affected by images of the character and nature of the
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continent. The political, military, economic, and social
realities of Africa are seen as both creating opportunies
for and limiting Soviet influence. Once again, perceptions
of this particular component break down along the
alarmist-conservative- liberal lines
.
A. THE ALARMIST IMAGE OF THE SOVIET THREAT
Alarmists see the Soviet Union as militantly and
ceaselessly expansionist. The ultimate goal is a world
communist state, total and complete victory over the
capitalist system. From this perspective Soviet policies
are "an integral part of a global strategy aimed at
weakening and subversion of the West." [Ref. 1: p. 47]
According to Daniel 0. Graham.
The USSR is proceeding . . .on the basis of a
comprehensively conceived and firmly held global
strategy that has as its overall purpose eroding the
world power and influence of the United States, and as
its cutting edge exacerbating and exploiting U.S.
difficulties in any region of the world, such as
southern Africa, that promise to contribute to this
purpose. [Ref. 2: p. vii]
Arguments of this kind generally depend on assumptions
concerning the importance of geostrategic considerations to
the economic and political survival of the United States.
Retired US Navy Admiral Robert Hanks is representative of
this school of thought, placing heavy emphasis on Soviet
naval buildup and global "choke points."
13
Assured access to sources of supply--as well as to
markets for exports, the latter crucial to the nation's
ability to pay for needed imports- -lies at the heart of
the problem, for a new threat to that assured access has
risen over the past two decades- -a menace which has gone
almost unremarked in the West in general and the US in
particular. The threat is manifested primarily in the
appearance of a large, modern, blue-water navy wearing
the Hammer and Sickle of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 3: p.
v]
Because of the geostrategic nature of this image,
alarmists view Africa as of crucial economic and strategic
importance to the West. For example, Ian Greig writes:
"Indeed, it can be argued that if Southern Africa were to
fall into anti-Western hands, the West could not survive at
all." [Ref. 4: p. 1]
If the alarmist believes the overriding Soviet goal is
the creation of a Communist dominated world-order, the
source of this expanionism is a lust for power based in
Communist ideology. While there are other factors, such as
Russian history, the root of Soviet aggressiveness lies
within the Marxist-Leninist system itself.
Experience of the past 67 years indicates that no
attempt to influence Soviet behavior has succeeded:
neither diplomatic ostracism, nor Yalta-like
conferences, nor nuclear threats, nor economic bribery.
This record of failure indicates that the cause of
Soviet aggression lies deeper--that it is systemic.
[Ref. 5: p. 13]
The alarmist image implies that the Soviets are prepared
to take any and all actions necessary in the pursuance of
unlimited expansion. Their policy is viewed as aggressively
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ambitious, initiatory not reactive. Again the alarmist
image of Soviet methods focuses on geostrategic concerns.
"One aspect of Soviet strategy has remained consistent: to
encourage and exploit denial to the West of benefits from
control over the economic resources of the Third World."
[Ref. 2: p. 9]
Moscow has seen all of Africa, but particularly Black
Africa, as offering an especially promising focal point
in their strategy of struggle to erode U.S. power and
influence throughout the world. As a beginning point,
the Soviets have demonstrated acute awareness, more so
in fact than Americans appear to, of the economic and
strategic importance of this mineral-rich region to the
U.S. and its allies. [Ref. 2: p. xvi]
Soviet objectives in Africa, say the alarmists, reflect
the overall goal of world domination. "The principle
hypothesis is that Soviet ambitions in Southern Africa
mirror a broad perspective in Moscow at the present juncture
in the evolution of the global power balance." [Ref. 2: p.
xxvii] Africa provides opportunities which the Soviets will
relentlessly exploit. Tangible evidence supports this
position, claim the alarmists, including the rise in Soviet
naval power and the obvious "drive" of the Soviets into
Southern Africa.
In the alarmist view, the Soviet decision-making system
is an efficient, monolithic machine subject to no internal
constraints of any consequence. The state is a rational
actor, choosing policies with very clear goals in mind and
swiftly, effectively implementing these decisions. The
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alarmist image acknowledges that the Soviet decision-making
process can be affected from outside the system, but only
through extreme measures. Only a forceful show of U.S.
resolve can deter the Soviets once a decision has been made.
The decision-making apparatus is seen as highly inflexible.
The alarmist believes the international system is very
polarized. In this view, with no neutral states, the world
is clearly divided into two camps. Competition and conflict
involving all important international actors is inevitable.
William Welch describes this view of inevitable polarization
as follows:
External alignments and interstate groupings follow
naturally, in compostion, structure, and functioning,
upon internal structure, by which they are generated.
The biggest and strongest of the Communist states welds
the lesser ones into a single organism, the better to
pursue its aggressive aims, and it imposes on this bloc
a tyrannical control. The biggest and strongest of the
democracies thereupon seeks, in reaction, to rally
around it the lesser democracies and non-Communist
states, and to unite them in collective defense
alliances, which it leads through persuasion and
exhortation as the first among equals. The two groups
exhaust the possibilities. There is no true third
alignment category. Those who claim to be neutral are
not truly such: if not clearly favoring the democratic
camp, they are for all intents and purposes in the
enemy's. [Ref. 6: p. 268]
The world, then, is divided clearly between "those
forces friendly or contributory to the desired future order
of peace and justice and those forces not friendly or
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contributory to such order." [Ref. 6: p. 268] Superior
force and American resolve are the tools with which to
counter Soviet influence in a strictly polarized, zero-sum,
alarmist world view.
The alarmist believes conditions in Africa offer
tremendous opportunities for Soviet gains. The weakness of
African political structures is seen as a clear opportunity
for the Soviets to establish a concrete political presence.
Because the continent is inherently unstable, African
leaders are quick to seize upon any ready solution. The
blueprint of Communism offers that solution, say the
alarmists, by providing inexperienced and insecure African
leaders with ready-made strategies and tactics with which to
attack immediately pressing problems. This political
naivete, say the alarmists, allows for substantial Soviet
gains. Further, nationalist and secessionist movements
abound throughout Africa and these groups are also
susceptible to Soviet bids.
Alarmists also believe that the military weakness of
virtually every black African nation provides the Soviets
with ample opportunity to seduce governments with offers of
defense assistance, creating dependencies that will not
easily be reversed.
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B. THE CONSERVATIVE IMAGE OF THE SOVIET THREAT
The conservative sees the Soviet Union as slightly less
expansionist and militant than the alarmist. While this
image "continues to affirm of (Soviet) behavior an
aggressiveness menacing to peace and order among nations"
[Ref. 6: p. 100], it also recognizes the existence of
certain limits to Soviet objectives. The impact of
ideological and strategic considerations on Soviet policy is
limited local conditions. There is no Soviet master plan
which is followed with single-minded purpose. As Jiri
Valenta has pointed out,
. . . Soviet leaders have not in recent years operated
with a carefully thought out master plan vis-a-vis
Africa. In fact, events have tended to shape their
behavior more than their behavior has shaped events. It
was clearly the dissolution of the Portugese empire, the
pressure from the Chinese to play the influence game,
and the distribution of power among the competing forces
in Angola, for example, that prompted to USSR to resume
aid to Neto and strengthen its ties with the MPLA . .
If such an important Soviet undertaking as the Angola
enterprise reflects no broad scheme for the continent,
then it hardly seems likely that such a scheme underlies
Soviet ventures of lesser consequence. [Ref. 7: p. 116]
Valenta is quick to point out, however, geo-political
concerns do influence Moscow's calculations. "(T)he
courses that Soviet leaders have chosen to pursue in
specific African situations have not reflected assessments
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of just local African factors. Not infrequently,
great-power considerations may weigh more heavily in the
minds of Soviet decision-makers than concrete African
circumstances." [Ref. 7: p. 116]
Conservatives view Africa as strategically and
economically important to the United States, although
certainly not as crucial as the alarmists claim. In their
view, the U.S. does have vital interests on the continent
which must be actively protected against Soviet inroads.
Soviet advances, again, are not simply blind adventurism.
. . . the unique circumstances of Soviet involvement in
Angola and the Horn and the shortage of facts fail to
indicate that the Soviets are following a coherent
course based on some form of master plan to win over
Africa. At the same time, the Soviet Union undoubtedly
has a certain predisposition, moreover a number of
unifying themes, behind its African involvement. Does
this amount to strategy? Perhaps. In the final
analysis, an imperfect and contradictory strategy is
strategy nevertheless when it provides a general
direction for foreign policy--as is happening in the
case of Soviet exploits in Africa. [Ref. 8: p. 38]
While conservatives agree that ideology is a major cause
of Soviet expansionism, they do not believe it is the only
or even the predominant cause. In their view, Soviet
ideological drives are mixed with more pragmatic
considerations, especially concerns about security. Because
the conservative does not see Soviet goals as rigidly rooted
in the Soviet system, a significant difference between the
conservative and alarmist images. The conservative sees
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potential for change in Soviet behavior. Soviet behavior is
perceived to be somewhat flexible and capable of evolution.
The conservative image also holds that the Soviets are
engaged in a concerted effort to erode U.S. influence, but
an effort limited somewhat by Soviet capabilities. The
Soviet Union is not, in this view single-minded in its
actions. Although highly active and initiatory, the Soviets
are also sensitive to the moves of others therefore, at
times, reactive.
This active, initiatory policy is evident in Africa.
Morris Rothenberg notes that "the USSR has diplomatic
relations with every country in Africa except South Africa,
Malawi, and Swaziland. It has trade, economic and
technical, cultural, and scientific agreements with most of
them." [Ref. 9: p. 67] Although conservatives find clear
evidence that the Soviet Union foments conflict and opposes
peaceful political solutions to problems in Africa, they do
not see Soviet methods as completely heavy-handed. This
image allows for some flexibility and caution in Soviet
actions, but to a much more limited degree than does the
liberal image.
The conservative image of Soviet decision-making, like
the alarmist image, focuses on the relative lack of domestic
constraint on Soviet decision-making. However, it
recognizes that some constraints do exist which at times
affect policy choices. This image correlates closely with
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one of Ole R. Holsti's models in which
policies are believed to reflect the inertia and other
attributes of policy-making by large bureaucratic
organizations. Thus, policy is likely to be
characterized by continuity (even when circumstances
have changed enough to result in something less than
totally-rational policies). Leaders come and go, but
the main contours of policy change at a glacial pace, if
at all, because pre-existing organizational processes,
commitments, SOPs and the like, -importantly influence
policy. [Ref. 10: p. 104]
This image perceives major changes in Soviet policy to
be more a function of U.S. resolve than of internal
developments. There is internal "pulling and tugging" 1
which does affect decision-making, but any major shift in
policy is seen as a result of American willingness to place
obstacles in the Soviet path. Conditions on the ground also
figure into Soviet planning, but, again, these
considerations are less important.
Africa retains a high Soviet priority in the
conservative image, although, again, not as high as would be
claimed by the alarmist camp. "After years of limited
interest, Moscow has come to look on Africa as the latest,
most promising arena for reducing Western and enhancing
Soviet influence." [Ref. 9: p. 1]
The conservative image of the structure of the
international system is also one of polarization. The
'See Graham Allison's Essence of Decision
,
(Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1971).
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behavior of the two actors, however, is less extreme. This
perception "concedes that responsiveness to the environment
has some place in (the) behavior (of the Soviets)."
[Ref. 6: p. 272]
For the conservative, then, "democracies do not always
behave peaceably, nor Communist states aggressively."
[Ref. 6: p. 273] Other categories of states are possible
(such as neutrals and the underdeveloped) and begin to play
independent roles. There are other forces at work, such as
nationalism and the rise of technology.
In consequence, threats to the desired future of peace
and justice, while they are still seen to come primarily
from Communist sources, no longer come exclusively from
there. They come also from excessive ethnocentrism,
from nuclear advance. The global condition is no longer
a two-sided, total war to the finish between democracies
and Communist states, open and closed societies. The
relationship between these two groups is now a "limited
adversary relationship." This relation changes- -has
changed and may change again; indeed the entire scene is
in flux. And there are other conflicts in progress.
[Ref. 6: p. 273]
However, the world is still seen as essentially a
competition between the two major powers.
The conservative believes African conditions create
opportunitiesfor Soviet advances, but recognizes that those
conditions can impose some limitations on the Soviets as
well as the West. Like the alarmist, the conservative
perceives the institutional fragility of Africa as an
invitation to Soviet meddling.
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As in Angola and Ethiopia, endemic African problems are
likely to provide virtually endless new opportunities
for future Soviet-Cuban involvement on the continent.
Both of these states exposed the fragility of the
national entities which replaced the colonial era- -in
Angola's case because of tribal and regional divisions
which transcended the formation of a cohesive nation and
state; in Ethiopia's similar divisions compounded by the
presence of companion nationalities on the other side of
Ethiopia's borders. The problem of tribal and regional
divisions has also already involved major civil strife
in Nigeria, the Sudan, Zaire, Burundi, and Cameroon, and
lesser quarrels in other countries. [Ref. 9: p. 266]
The conservative believes that the Soviets understand
that the African environment imposes some limitations. For
instance, "while Soviet authors suggest that the lack of
well defined social groups eases the way for radical
takeovers in Africa, they see the same factor as a
hinderance to early transformation of these regimes into
Soviet-style states and as prime sources of possible
reversals." [Ref. 9: p. 96]
The conservative also agrees that the economic
limitations of the Soviet Union prevents communist
exploitation of Africa's economic vulnerability. "The USSR
evidently has neither the inclination nor the ability to
assume a dominant economic role in any given African country
as it has assumed in Cuba." [Ref. 9: p. 266]
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C. THE LIBERAL IMAGE OF THE SOVIET THREAT
The liberal view of Soviet goals strongly discounts the
existence of any coherent master plan. In contrast with the
conservative, however, Soviet expansiveness is seen as more
severely restricted. For example, William Welch argues that
"Soviet aggression is an occasional, not a normal state of
affairs, and it occurs not as an expression of an inherent
drive on instinctive traits but as a reaction to what appear
to be the menacing actions of environing states." [Ref. 6:
p. 135]
The liberal image de-emphasizes the strategic importance
of Africa. "Africa is geographically distant from the USSR
and does not present immediate security concerns such as
those that affect Soviet policy in the Middle East region."
[Ref. 1: p. 35] However, liberals such as R. Craig Nation
also recognize that "in rejecting grand design arguments one
should not neglect the very real strategic concerns that do
affect Soviet African engagement." [Ref. 1: p. 35]
Alarmists and conservatives believe Soviet expansion is
unlimited and slightly limited, respectively. In contrast,
some liberals believe many Soviet actions are a "simple
response to a hostile environment (which) will disappear
24
with disappearance of that hostility." [Ref. 6: p. 135]
While the Soviet Union is still seen as a threat to U.S.
interests, in the liberal view that threat is less dire,
grounded as it is in Soviet insecurity and traditional great
power politics.
Clearly the practice of Soviet policy in Africa cannot
be explained or understood simply in terms of its
professed commitment to international proletarian
revolution; in fulfilling its new role as a superpower
Soviet behavior is no different from that of any other
major power whose priority concern is to pursue its own
state interests. This is well understood in Africa,
where the USSR is seen and treated not as the world
leader of revolutionary internationalism, but as a power
contesting for supremacy with the United States.
[Ref. 11: p. 13]
Liberals believe the Soviets are expansionist, only in a
more limited sense that either conservatives or alarmists.
In their view, Soviet expansion is cautious, restrained, and
uneven, often defensive, rather than offensive in nature.
The main determinant of the character of Soviet policy is
said to be the unique dynamics of each particular situation.
For example, David Albright argues that there is no evident
hierarchy of objectives in Soviet thinking and that "the
bearing any particular objective has had on Soviet behavior
has varied widely from place to place." [Ref. 12: p. 57]
According to this image, Soviet expansion is not a part
of a coherent master plan to advance world communism or
seize strategic advantages. Rather, the Soviets are simply
reacting to situations that provide them with opportunities
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to gain advantage or secure a defensive posture. How Soviet
leaders interpret and respond to specific opportunities is
determined by state/national interests.
Liberals agree that the Soviets are sometimes
initiatory, but claim that the Soviets are primarily
reactive. The liberal image holds that local conditions
have been primarily responsible for drawing the Soviets into
Africa. Albright has claimed that "one can best
characterize recent policy in Africa as reactive and
cautious." [Ref. 12: p. 58] Moreover, the Soviets are
believed to clearly recognize their limitations and their
methods of goal pursuance reflect this recognition.
Expanded Soviet engagement in Africa has not led to a
dramatic accumulation of influence, and as a result yet
another reevaluation (of the Soviet threat) is in
progress, emphasizing the limitations which Soviet
policy confronts .... [Ref. 1: p. 27]
The ongoing Soviet reevaluation of Third World policy will
emphasize a more cautious and limited method of
implementation, according to the liberal view.
The liberal image of Soviet decision-making is not one
of a rational actor or monolith, but one of a large
bureaucratic organization, made up of competing groups which
are forced to negotiate policy. Some proponents of this
image conceive
of the government as being composed of competing
factions. Policy may be seen as emerging out of the
interplay of that competition, or the (proponent) may
26
believe that there are at least groups within the
opposing nation that would pursue different policies.
[Ref. 10: p. 104]
Changes in Soviet policy, then, are very much affected
by the internal dynamics of the bureaucracy. Conditions "on
the ground" also play a large role in policy formulation.
This image, in contrast to the conservative, sees Soviet
involvement in Africa as having little to do with American
action or inaction. While U.S. resolve may affect
decision-making, it is certainly not the major agent of
change in Soviet policy.
One, and apparently the predominant, view is that no
single sort of behavior or circumstance has proved
consistently the most critical (in affecting Moscow's
decision making). That is, the importance of individual
kinds of behavior or circumstances has varied from case
to case." [Ref. 13: p. 226]
Africa is not perceived by the liberals to be as
strategically important as the conservatives and alarmists
would claim. While certainly the continent is important to
the Soviets, they have no hard strategic or economic
interests there and the priority is therefore low.
Although liberal views differ radically, 2 a majority of
liberals see the structure of the international system as
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one of very loose bipolarity. While the U.S. and the Soviet
Union are the major players, there is nothing within the
structure of the international system which makes conflict
inevitable. Like conservatives, liberals recognize a number
of forces throughout the system. "Action in one direction
or the other is not the product of a structure that can be
readily marked, but the product of the contingencies of
time, circumstance, and, indeed, accident." [Ref. 6: p.
271]
While the Communists do represent a threat, they
certainly do not represent the only threat, and in many
situations not even not the most serious threat. The
liberals see the global condition as more varied and complex
than the conservative. The Soviets are acting as a typical
state; pursuing their own interests. The structure of the
system does not bring the two major powers into conflict
inevitably and they need not counter every move the other
makes
.
Application (of policy) to the concrete situation
depends on the contingencies of time and place, on a
pragmatic assessment of particular circumstances. Such
policy and action, while incumbent on all states,
whatever their internal structure may be, are
particularly so upon the great powers, upon whom
especially the future rides. [Ref. 6: p. 272]
The liberal also perceives the structure of the
international system as a limitation of Soviet influence.
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The Soviet Union is not a participant in major economic
organizations such as the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund, and thus can exert no
influence through these bodies. Increasingly it is
aware of and subjected to pressures associated with a
Western-dominated economic system on which it depends
for trade and credits. [Ref. 14: p. 8]
The liberal believes the nature of the African
environment limits, more than assists, Soviet attempts to
gain influence. "If Africa's weakness has facilitated great
power meddling, its inherent strength and promise have also
served to frustrate external actors in their search for
permanent influence." [Ref. 15: p. 1] While the internal
dynamics of Africa offer potential for involvement, the
achievement of substantial gain is unlikely. "These
dynamics have drawn the USSR almost inexorably into- -the
maelstrom of African politics, but they also serve to
delimit what the Soviets can hope to achieve." [Ref. 1: p.
48] Nationalism, tribalism, and other intricate components
of the nature of Africa would prevent any lasting Soviet
presence. For example, Cyrus Vance argued during a review
of US African policy following the Cuban intervention in the
Horn "that African nationalism was strong enough to preclude
permanent Soviet domination." [Ref. 16: p. 91]
Liberals believe that Soviet limitations will prevent
any substantial progress in the economic arena, noting, for
example, that Angola and Mozambique are turning more
frequently toward the West. The economic structure of
Africa, then, only serves to highlight a weakness of the
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Soviet Union, which certainly limits Communist influence on
the continent.
Close examination of liberal perceptions reveals an
interesting subcategory of this image: the confident
liberal. A classic statement of confident liberalism is
provided by Robert Price, who argues that the U.S. tends,
mistakenly, to see radicalization of African governments as
detrimental to U.S. interests.
Radical political transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa,
especially when it occurs with substantial assistance
from the Soviet Union, is usually viewed as dangerous to
the United States in one or both of two ways--as a
threat to certain tangible military and/or economic
interests, and as a challenge to the credibility of U.S.
power in the area, which if not met would weaken the
position of the United States within the global system.
Careful analysis of the context within 'which such
radical transformations have occurred, or are occurring,
reveals, however, that the calculation of these threats
is based on assumptions that are no longer rooted in the
facts of the real world. As such the "threats" are more
myth than reality, and the policies developed to respond
to them are dangerously "out of sync" with the
environment in which they must operate. [Ref. 17: p.
59]
Price proceeds to demolish the geostrategic argument offered
by Hanks and others, claiming, for example, that "the
scenario of a blockade of Western shipping lanes (is) not
only far-fetched but logically implausible." [Ref. 17: p.
60]
Price, Richard Feinberg, and other confident liberals
recognize that the U.S. does have very real economic
interests in Africa.
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These, however, are not threatened by radical
transformation. Both the structure of the economic
systems of African states and changes in the
international economic system have led to a situation in
which radical states are no less desirous than so-called
moderate states of maintaining active trading relations
with the West, and obtaining access to Western capital
markets, managerial know-how, and technology. [Ref. 17:
p. 60]
Feinberg agrees that the economic structure of the world
places tremendous limitations on the ability of the Soviet
Union to exert influence in the Third World. The Soviets
simply cannot provide economic assistance comparable to the
West. Soviet aid programs continue to lack flexibility and
breadth, he notes, and the Soviets have resisted pressure
for more economic aid from radical Third World states.
[Ref. 18: p. 138]
These trends in Soviet economic capabilities,
philosophy, and behavior are making Moscow a less
attractive patron to Third World states. The Soviet
Union offers no solution to ballooning and chronic
balance-of -payments deficits facing the developing
nations. Soviet behavior with Allende and Manley
suggests 'that Moscow would rather allow some friendly
regimes to fall than to risk substantial economic
resources. The disillusionment of regimes in Egypt, the
Sudan, and Iraq with the Soviet Union was partly the
result of their discovering that friendship with the
Soviets was economically unrewarding; each has, to
varying degrees, moved diplomatically away from Moscow.
Moscow's inability to incorporate self -proclaimed
Marxist regimes such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia
into a socialist economic system will inevitably weaken
Moscow's ability to dictate their foreign policies.
[Ref. 18: p. 139]
The confident liberals also refute the essentially
conservative notion that we must counter the Soviets in
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Africa because of our concern for credibility; an idea which
was championed by Henry Kissinger immediately after the
Communists provided assistance to the MPLA in Angola. The
problem, says the confident liberal, is that the U.S.
defines situations as threatening to American credibility
when in fact no real interests are at stake.
A given Soviet move becomes a threat to U.S.
"credibility" only when it is perceived by various
audiences (the Soviets themselves, U.S. allies, the
American public, etc.) as constituting a significant
challenge to American interests, influence, desires,
etc. When U.S. government spokesmen define Soviet moves
in this manner, they contribute to such a perception.
[Ref. 17: p. 60]
Two major points further define the confident liberal
assessment of the Soviet threat. First, Soviet activity
should not be confused with Soviet influence. "The purchase
of Soviet weapons or hydroelectrical machinery does not
signal alignment with Moscow .... This erroneous logic
underestimates the severe problems that the Soviets have
confronted in their Third World diplomacy." [Ref. 18: p.
131] Soviet influence in Africa has been grossly
overestimated, claim the confident liberals. Price
discounts the possibility of Soviet basing on the continent,
claiming that in Africa nothing would symbolize subservience
more forcefully than the establishment of a large, permanent
military installation by a foreign state.
The post- independence record of Angola and Mozambique
should undermine any assumption that Soviet/Cuban-backed
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regimes will automatically become the hosts to
substantial Soviet military bases. [Ref. 17: p. 8]
Secondly, while the confident liberals recognize that
Soviet activity on the continent has increased, they
conclude that "the odds are overwhelmingly against the
establishment of any permanent presence in Africa."
[Ref. 19] The Soviet limitations refered to earlier
underscore "the extreme fragility of Soviet influence in
African and Third World states." [Ref. 17: p. 9]
Given the limited commitment to Marxism in most such
states, their susceptibility to nationalism, and their
considerable developmental difficulties, an overriding
lesson of recent history would seem to be that the
Soviet Union is unable to sustain its influence when it
is challenged by the West on instrumental grounds- -that
is, in the provision of capital, technological
assistance, access to export markets, and the like.
[Ref. 17: p. 9]
The confident liberal, in summary, rejects the
geostrategic argument and essentially claims that the U.S.
has few tangible interests at stake in Africa, none of which
is seriously threatened by the radicalization of African
states. Soviet activity should not be confused with Soviet
influence. The Soviet Union cannot hope to sustain a
lasting, influential presence in Africa. Finally, the U.S.
must recognize that its own role in Africa is limited.
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Let us recognize that our interests in Africa are
limited, that our wisdom about Africa is even more
limited, and that our power to decide the future of
Africa is very limited indeed. Let us be extremely
cautious about trying to settle African problems that
Africans will, and must, settle for themselves.
[Ref. 19]
The Soviet threat in Africa is, in the confident liberal




IV. CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEVEL OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
Different images of the Soviet threat are more or less
mutable, showing varying degrees of change over time in
response to changing circumstances and events. Constancy or
inconstancy is a direct function of the nature of the core
components of the individual image. The alarmist sees the
Soviet threat as very real and dangerous. On the other
hand, confident liberals do not see the Soviet Union as a
significant threat in Africa simply because the U.S.
national interest is not sufficiently at stake.
Conservatives and liberals agree that the level of Soviet
influence in Africa can and does change, but disagree on the
determinants of these changes.
A. THE ALARMIST
For the alarmist, the Soviet threat is ominous and
constant. Events of the past ten years have produced little
or no change in alarmist views of Soviet goals or methods.
Alarmists saw Soviet actions in Angola and Ethiopia in the
latter 1970' s, for example, as reflecting a "broadening,
deepening and hardening of the general pattern of Soviet
aggressiveness." [Ref. 9: p. vii]
Thus, there is a direct causative relationship between
developments in Soviet African policies and other
displays of Soviet aggressiveness that have so startled
the world in recent times, including the invasion of
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Afghanistan and Moscow's strident support of Iran in the
hostage crisis and its other conflicts with the U.S.;
Moscow's threatening posture toward U.S. efforts to
preserve its dwindling power in the Persian Gulf and
even in the vast reaches of the Indian Ocean; the
stationing of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. . . ;
Moscow's welcoming of the Nicaraguan revolution. . .
;
the partnership with Vietnam in the military occupation
of Cambodia. [Ref. 9: p. vii]
The alarmists were initially heartened by the election
of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan
stood without ambiguity for the view that the conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union was the
central issue of our time; that in this struggle the
United States had been falling behind while an
expansionist Soviet Union was forging ahead; and that
unless we made every effort to restore and assert our
power, the future world would belong to the forces of
totalitarian Communism. [Ref. 20: p. 25]
Due to the nature of the alarmist image of the Soviet
threat, however, arguments soon began to appear in alarmist
literature which played down Reagan's effectiveness against
the Soviets. The threat was not being suppressed, but, in
fact was continuing to grow.
For the alarmist this initial optimism was shortlived
for two reasons. First, "the Reagan administration
implicitly agreed with its opponents in interpreting the
election not so much as a mandate for changing the foreign
policy of the nation as for reforming the economy."
[Ref. 20: p. 26] When Reagan's economic policy conflicted
with the interests of his foreign policy, the former was
favored. The grain deals and ineffective pipeline sanctions
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underscored this lower priority. The administration had
misunderstood a new, ant i- Communist consensus for a mandate
to economic reform. Secondly, this lower priority of
foreign policy allowed apologist elements to mount
opposition against attempts to counter the threat.
The net result of this assignment to economic policy of
a higher priority than foreign policy was the creation
of a vacuum into which the opposition to the 1980
consensus was able to move. [Ref. 20: p. 27]
For the alarmist the election of Ronald Reagan was a
glimmer of hope, but little has materialized in the way of
concrete opposition to the rising Soviet threat. This
development was inevitable due given the nature of the
alarmist image of Soviet policy; an image that is
relentlessly hyperbolic. American resolve is always seen
lacking, resulting in a U.S. policy that for all practical
purposes is simply a form of appeasement.
It is here that we finally arrive at the juncture where
pacifism and isolationism- -the two great shapers of the
opposition to the 1980 consensus- -meet and merge into a
single mighty wave of appeasement. [Ref. 20: p. 36]
The alarmist image of the Soviet threat is constant.
The Soviets are seen as acting on the basis of a master plan
designed to promote a Communist world order. This threat
will be constant and pressing until it is defeated. There
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can be no peaceful coexistence; conflict is inevitable.
This image of the Soviet threat is constant because the
nature of its components dictates constancy.
Bo THE CONSERVATIVE
As explained earlier the conservative sees the Soviet
Union as essentially expansionist, but somewhat constrained.
While global considerations weigh heavily in Soviet
calculations, local conditions are not ignored. The
conservative sees Africa in general as strategically
important to the U.S. 3 and therefore important to the Soviet
Union, since a polarized international structure necessarily
fosters competition. Soviet activity . is viewed as
opportunistic, but the Soviet Union does have certain
predispositions and a number of unifying themes behind its
involvement in Africa. Finally, Africa offers unique
opportunities for Soviet inroads due to its tenuous
structure, although this structure also promises some
limitations
.
The conservative acknowledges that Soviet influence in
Africa is a function of many variables.
3 Note that the conservative, unlike the alarmist, does
not see Africa as of utmost geostrategic importance to the
U.S. Henry Kissinger noted, for example, that Angola was
not vital to U.S. interests in and of itself, but it was the
concern for American credibility which necessitated a show
of action by the U.S. However, the conservative image is
one which places considerably more emphasis on the strategic
importance of Africa than the liberal perception.
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Moscow's decision-making with respect to the continent
in the year ahead will probably be shaped by a
combination of the opportunities that present themselves
in Africa, global politics, the Cuban factor,
bureaucratic and domestic politics in the USSR, and last
but not least, the willingness of the West to employ the
power at its disposal to heighten the risks for the
Soviets in exploiting the opportunities that confront
them. [Ref. 7: p. 117]
It is the conservative consensus, however, that the most
important element in Soviet decision-making is the
willingness or ability of the U.S. to make any Soviet
adventure a costly one. Perceptions of a lack of U.S.
resolve, claims the conservative, will inevitably lead to
Soviet action. This interpretation
contends that the alterations in the U.S. -USSR strategic
balance have produced a qualitatively new state of
affairs in Africa. The have convinced Moscow of an
impending shift in the regional correlation of forces.
It is this, the assessment runs, that the USSR has
aggressively been seeking to exploit. This school of
thought goes on to argue that Moscow may well step up
these efforts as the strategic superiority that the
school foresees for the USSR in the 1980s develops.
From such a perspective, then, the growing inability of
the United States to deter Soviet military actions in
Africa has emerged as the crucial determinant of the
USSRs relations with the continent. [Ref. 13: pp.
231-2]
A rise in Soviet influence, in this image, is basically
the result of U.S. inability to counter the Soviets. While
local conditions may have eased the Soviets entry into
Africa, for example, the ability to project influence is
seen as a direct function of U.S. resolve.
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Whatever caution Moscow may still see fit to observe in
particular situations, there can be little doubt that as
a general manner it will continue in a relentless effort
to dislodge the West from remaining positions in Africa
and it seems evident that failure of the U.S. to react
in Angola and Ethiopia, as well as Soviet perceptions of
a general decline in U.S. strength and resolve, will
tend to weigh increasingly against caution and in favor
of boldness. [Ref. 9: p. 267]
The second element of change in Soviet influence (which
is a correlary of the conservative assumption concerning
U.S. resolve) is that the Soviets are more willing to act
not simply because the U.S. has weakened but because they
themselves are stronger.
Angola and all that followed has sharpened our growing
fears of an eroding military balance. The image of
Soviet and Cuban fighting in Angola and Ethiopia ripples
all the way back to the level of the strategic arms race
and the state of the balance in Europe. The assumption
is that the Soviets are bolder because they are stronger
than ever and, some would say, maybe even stronger than
we. [Ref. 21: p. 756]
The implication to be drawn from these two factors of
Soviet influence is, then, that the U.S. must act to counter
Soviet activity, regardless of whether U.S. interests are
directly and immediately threatened. A failure to confront
the Soviets, claim the conservatives, will simply lead to
further advance and the potential for more serious
confrontation. As Robert Legvold has paraphrased Henry
Kissinger,
Unless this country acts decisively to constrain Soviet
expansion and prove to the Soviet leaders that a
relaxation of tensions is not compatible with a
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systematic attempt to overturn the geopolitical
equilibrium. . .then sooner or later a showdown is
likely to occur with tremendous dangers for everybody.
[Ref. 21: p. 755]
Paul Nitze noted in 1982 that American Soviet policy had
been perceived as less than organized and made an attempt
"to outline an approach to a more coherent Western
strategy." [Ref. 22: p. 82] After detailing his strategy,
which focused heavily on military readiness and
modernization, Nitze concluded that
what is clear beyond a doubt is that if the United
States does not act along the lines proposed here, the
kind of Soviet gains and threats to world peace that
have arisen in the last five years will multiply
inexorably and perhaps, in the end, irretrievably.
[Ref. 22: p. 97]
It is not surprising that the conservative, who sees the
international system as highly polarized, projects this
perception of the global structure onto Soviet
policy-makers. The conservative sees the world as
essentially zero-sum and therefore concludes that the
Soviets do the same.
Moscow's record indicates that, as far as the Soviet
elite is concerned, a zero-sum game, where a loss for
one competitor is automatically a gain for another,
still dominates the rules of the competition for power,
influence, and resources in the Third World. Africa is
just another component in the Soviet world outlook,
viewing America's international presence as the single
most important obstacle to channeling change in a
direction favorable to Soviet interests and values.
[Ref. 8: pp. 27-8]
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The conservative advocates an active, confrontational
policy. This policy is designed to prevent the projection
of Soviet influence by making Soviet actions more costly
than the potential benefits. While the focus of this policy
may be on a specific instance, a main objective is to
prevent the Soviets from future advances in other
situations. Hence, the U.S. need not have vital interests
at stake in any particular situation to justify a
confrontational stance.
In the conservative view, American resolve and Soviet
capabilities are the main, albeit not only, determinants of
changes in the level of Soviet influence in the Third World.
For the conservative, as will be detailed later, events over
the past ten years have shown that "a failure of American
will may well have opened many doors for the Soviets in
Africa." [Ref. 23: p. 206] but tangible evidence of a
strengthening of U.S. resolve may have begun to close them.
C. LIBERAL
The liberal sees the Soviet Union as expansion-minded,
yet tightly constrained. Soviet aggression is not a normal
state of affairs, but is often reactive and defensive.
Expansion is pursued cautiously and unevenly. Local
conditions are extremely important. Soviet decision-making
is influenced more by local realities and internal political
maneuvering than by considerations of U.S. resolve. Africa
is seen as of lesser importance to the Soviet Union than
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conservatives would claim. The nature of the African
environment ultimately provides enormous limitations on the
Soviet's ability to exert influence.
From the liberal point of view Soviet influence is
determined by local conditions and events. For example,
Albright writes
On balance, local African conditions have been of
greater importance in triggering Soviet action. Had not
elements of the Ethiopian military overthrown Haile
Selassie and subsequently embarked on a "socialist"
revolution, for example, it is debatable whether Moscow
would have had the chance to enhance its position in
Ethiopia. Certainly, the opportunity to do so would not
have been as great. Similarly, the inability of the
MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to form some type of coalition
government in Angola and the MPLAs ' s determination to
install itself in office by whatever means required gave
the USSR the essential opening that led to its Angolan
operation. Even the Soviet Union's arms agreements with
Libya and Uganda resulted from local requests, not from
prodding on Moscow's part. [Ref. 12: pp. 58-9]
In the view of liberals such as Michael Clough, the
conservative image of Soviet influence in Africa is based on
a misreading of recent history. "Contrary to conservative
mythology, Soviet 'successes' in Angola in 1975-76 and
Ethiopia in 1977-78 were primarily the result of situational
advantages rather than a lack of American resolve."
[Ref. 24]
The liberal image claims that the conservative tendency
to view all problems in East-West terms has a tremendous
effect on assessments of the Soviet threat in Africa.
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Although both the United States and the USSR approach
Africa in the light of their global rivalry, the most
important forces conditioning the role of outside powers
in the continent remain those indigenous to the
continent itself. Approaches that attempt to interpret
Soviet African policy through the prism of East/West
rivalry generally distort on a number of levels: They
overvalue the ability of the Soviets to control complex
events from their national territory; miss the
constraints that inhibit Soviet initiatives; exaggerate
the degree to which calculated dependency relationships
translate into meaningful influence; err in typing
proudly nationalistic regimes as subservient Soviet
"clients"; and negate the strength of Africa's own
aspirations as an independent force. The dynamics of
decolonization, modernization, tribal and ethnic
identity, nationalism, and black self-assertion remain
fundamental forces in Sub-Saharan African affairs, which
superpowers and analysts ignore at their own peril.
[Ref. 15: p. 5]
If the major determinants of Soviet influence are, in
the liberal image, local African dynamics, changes in the
level of that influence are brought on by changes in the
situation on the ground. For the liberal, the local African
conditions do provide opportunities for Communist influence.
Find an exploiter and an exploited population, and
Marxism-Leninism will take root. Without exploitation
and the well-spring of bitterness and hatred it
provides, Marxism-Leninism by its very origins has no
serious appeal. [Ref. 25: p. 92]
The liberal perceives the conservative policy of
confrontation as exacerbating local conditions, creating
further opportunity for Soviet involvement. The liberal,
then, would
suggest caution against American overreaction to Soviet
power projections. Soviet power may well be
substantially less awesome than meets the eye, and,
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given the nature of global interdependence,
opportunities for U.S.- Soviet cooperation over Third
World problems may be lost. . .Increased U.S. military
spending to meet a perceived Soviet threat in the Third
World meanwhile raises Soviet insecurities, and
strengthens both Soviet and U.S. bureaucratic groups
favoring military weapons expenditures --and hence their
political power to continue the confrontation.
[Ref. 14: p. 9]
This confrontational policy is seen by the liberals as
misguided and dangerous.
The fact is that some American conservatives. . .have
done more for Soviet foreign policy than any KGB
operatives. Those congressmen and senators who complain
loudest about Soviet influence are exactly those whose
action promotes that influence. [Ref. 25: pp. 167-8] We
liberals saw the Soviets gaining because of, not despite
these conservatives. . .left to their own devices, the
hardliners would perform all of the Soviet's heavy work
for them. [Ref. 25: p. 97]
If the U.S. does not overreact, say the liberals, the
Soviets are left with little justification for further
intervention and will be overwhelmed by the regional
dynamics refered to earlier. As Paul Tsongas notes
in the U.N. role call on Afghanistan was a list of
nations that once had close ties with the Soviets but
voted against them: Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, Ghana, and
the Sudan. In each case, we did not overreact to the
Soviet presence in their country. Without the United
States to kick around, the Soviets were left to their
own devices, failed, and were cast aside as heavy-handed
interventionists. . .The conclusion is obvious. The
Third World is ours to lose, not theirs to win. The
Soviets need Western mistakes in order to succeed. They
require an environment poisoned by misguided Western
policy before their ideology can thrive. In a neutral
environment, they wither rather quickly. [Ref. 25: p.
167]
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This perception of Soviet limitations in no way suggests
that the liberal would propose an inactive policy in Africa;
far from it.
By avoiding the field of battle, we will not effectively
offset Soviet influence. We give the Soviets a free
ride. They would be deeply concerned if we abandoned
this forfeiture of influence and sent emissaries to
Havana, Luanda, and Hanoi. [Ref. 25: p. 188]
The liberal offers an aggressive U.S. policy but with a much
different thrust than the conservative. Rather than
confront the Soviets, the liberal proposes to attack the
circumstances which provide opportunities for Soviet
involvement. For example, Cyrus Vance has noted that
The critical question was what politically and
militarily feasible strategy would most effectively
counter Soviet actions while advancing our overall
interests. . .1 remained convinced that the heart of our
strategy must be to combine diplomacy, negotiations,
concerted Western actions, and the powerful forces of
African nationalism to resolve local disputes, and to
remove ostensible justification for Soviet involvement.
[Ref. 16: pp. 84-5]
This approach to U.S. Third World policy requires
abandonment of the East-West mentality and encourages the
development of economic ties with Third World nations. The
leader of an underdeveloped country seldom is thinking
strictly in ideological terms (although there are
exceptions). "The country's economic development is the top
priority on his agenda. His needs are trade and investment.
The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
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is important to us but not crucial to him." [Ref. 25: p
183] The liberal believes that
.over the long haul both Western and African
interests will best be served by policies that emphasize
the priority of economic development . The most
fundamental source of instability in Africa is not
Soviet meddling but rather the brutish impoverishment
that bears with particular severity upon the Sub-Saharan
region. Until this underlying dilemma is effectively
addressed, no amount of strategic commitment or
diplomatic maneuvering will suffice, and political
turmoil, sudden changes in international orientation,
and the threat of deepening Soviet involvement will
remain on Africa's political agenda. [Ref. 26: p. 183]
In summary, local conditions dominate the liberal
perception of Soviet influence in Africa. Certainly the
Soviets calculate potential U.S. responses to specific
circumstances, but actual inroads into the continent are
made because regional realities permit or even encourage it.
U.S. resolve often has had the effect of exacerbating these
conditions by raising Soviet insecurities. This does not
all add up to a hands-off liberal policy. The liberal
advocates an active U.S. policy to solve the local problems
which create opportunities for Soviet intervention.
Dealing with a powerful beast requires power. Dealing
with a powerful beast that feels increasingly cornered
requires power--and brains. [Ref. 25: p. 110]
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D. THE CONFIDENT LIBERAL
The confident liberal does not see the Soviet Union as a
significant threat in Africa for several reasons. The most
striking confident liberal claim is that the U.S. national
interest simply is not sufficiently at stake in Africa to
warrant great concern. Further, as outlined in chapter
three, the limitations of the Soviet Union and the structure
of Africa preclude Soviet activity on the continent from
transforming into lasting influence. The confident liberal




V. THE DEBATE BEGINS : THE RISE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN
AFRICA
There is virtually no disagreement that the Soviet-Cuban
intervention in Angola in 1975-76 demonstrated a new
willingness and capability of the Soviet Union to project
power beyond its borders. The Soviets successfully
supported a massive intervention by Cuban troops'* into the
former Portugese colony on behalf of the MPLA faction in
that country's civil war.
There is general agreement that Soviet influence in
Africa rose dramatically during this time, regardless of
problems involved in measuring that influence or predicting
its permanence. The real debate to be examined here is why
different groups believe the Soviets were able to establish
themselves as a major force in African affairs.
As outlined above, the conservative and liberal images
perceive Soviet influence in very different terms. The
"Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe claim that the best
Western estimates of peak Cuban troop deployment in Angola
is approximately 20,000. They further note that Castro, in
a speech in December 1979, gave the number of Cuban troops
in Angola in 1976 as 36,000. See reference 43, page 83.
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purpose of this section is twofold: to show that these
images generally agree that Soviet influence was rising
during the Angolan intervention and to outline the
differences in these assessments.
A. ANGOLA
Liberals see the Soviet intervention in Angola as an
opportunistic move. In their view, specific local
conditions, such as the sudden withdrawal of the Portugese
and the inability of the feuding factions within the country
to achieve a lasting compromise, drew the Soviets into the
conflict. They challenge the argument that a lack of
U.S. resolve led to the Soviet action. In fact, many
liberals would say that the Ford administration's attempted
intervention in early 1975 in part precipitated Soviet
intervention. Conservatives, on the other hand, see the
Soviet push into Angola as another example of the USSR's
willingness to foster radicalism when not opposed by a
decisive American policy.
1. Conservative
Although the Soviet-Cuban intervention into Angola
was massive and swift, conservatives "recognized" long
before the incursion that Africa was a prime target for
Communist influence. This recognition had its basis in the
conservative image of the Soviet threat. The U.S. was
perceived to have considerable interests in the continent;
interests which were being threatened by a number of
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developments. The Soviets had constructed a missile supply
base near Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The new leader of
Mozambique had declared his nation to be a "People's
Republic." In Zambia land was being nationalized and Angola
was clearly in a state of chaos.
This uncertainty, in the conservative view, created
vast opportunities for the Soviets. Radicalism was
inherently detrimental to U.S. interests and had to be
checked. Rhodesia and South Africa were seen as stabilizing
forces to be fully supported. For the conservative, even
before the Soviets and Cuban entered Angola, developments
seemed to point inevitably to Soviet intervention. In
August 1975, just prior to the introduction of massive
Soviet and Cuban military assistance into Angola, Anthony
Harrigan noted that
viewed overall, the situation in and around Africa is
changing very fast. The United States must make a
prompt adjustment to changed political and strategic
realities. If the necessary new security arrangements
aren't made, Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism
will be fastened on a vast global region. [Ref. 27]
Soviet involvement in Angola, then, should have been
no surprise to the conservatives, given their preconceptions
outlined earlier. Soviet actions were consistent with
perceived Soviet goals.
How the tactics pursued in Angola fit into the larger
picture of Soviet strategy is depicted in Moscow
writings
. . . that make no secret of the fact that the
aim of Soviet-policy is to change the worldwide
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"correlation of forces" in favor of socialism .
(Angola's) contribution may be minute. But its success
would help Moscow to use the Angola precedent to exact
similar contributions from a few at first, the from
more, of the "hundred countries" which are its target.
[Ref. 28]
The Soviets were not simply responding to a request from a
friendly government, but establishing themselves for future
actions. Morris Rothenberg's studies of Soviet literature
led him to conclude that "most significant of all, Soviet
commentaries saw events in Angola not as an end in
themselves, but as a spur to further advances in Africa."
[Ref. 9: p. 17]
For the conservative a crucial element in the Soviet
decision to become heavily involved in Angola was a
perception that the United States would not confront them.
"Soviet involvement in Angola started cautiously but picked
up momentum as the USSR began to judge the risks of
confrontation with the West as minimal." [Ref. 9: p. 11]
Jiri Valenta has observed that
the Soviet leadership had plenty of evidence from
American behavior on the ground in Angola that the
post-Vietnam domestic mood constituted a barrier to
forceful U.S. action. For example, instead of openly
challenging the initial Soviet-Cuban involvement in
Angola in the spring and summer of 1975, the U.S.
government . . . had furnished covert paramilitary aid
to the FNLA and UNITA through Kinshasa (Zaire). Even in
the summer of 1975 this paramilitary aid was still quite
limited .... [Ref. 7: p. 108]
The fundamental assumption in the conservative
threat assessment is that a lack of American will led
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directly to further Soviet involvement in Angola. Henry
Kissinger said in a speech to the World Affairs Council in
Dallas in March 1976 that "the danger was and is that our
inaction . . . will lead to further Soviet and Cuban
pressures on the mistaken assumption that America has lost
the will to counter adventurism or even help others to do
so." [Ref. 29]
The failure of Congress to appropriate sufficient
funds, in support of anti-Communist factions in Angola was
seen as another example of "a consistent policy of bending
over backward to avoid antagonizing the Soviets." [Ref. 30]
More importantly, in this image, was the failure of the U.S.
government to support a general build-up of military
preparedness. This would inevitably lead to disaster, since
naturally, the Soviets will become more aggressive in
such behavior as the military balance tilts further in
their direction. [Ref. 30]
Conservatives pointed to evidence that many African
leaders agreed that a Soviet victory in Angola would
escalate into a far worse defeat for the West elsewhere in
Africa. U.S. inaction was difficult to fathom and perhaps
even more serious in itself than the actual Soviet
intervention.
What frightens Zaire, Zambia, and other non-aligned
nations of Southern Africa even more than the massive
Soviet military aid to Angola is the contrasting U.S.
refusal to help. As (Zairian foreign minister) Nzuga
told us and warned congressmen: "The Africans, I am
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sorry to say, are losing their confidence in the United
States. Whenever there is any trouble, the U.S. says,
'No more Vietnams.' That is hard for us to understand."
[Ref. 31]
The rise of Soviet influence in Angola, then, was a
direct result of the failure of the United States to
confront the Soviets and make adventurism costly.
Rothenberg has noted that Kissinger "denied that U.S.
military intervention would have been necessary, contending
that his proposed program would have made the situation, if
not untenable, then so costly for the Cubans that they would
have sought a settlement.'" [Ref. 9: p. 13]
The conservative claims that the U.S. had a moral
responsibility to counter Soviet influence in Angola.
America is not the policeman of the world. We have no
mandate to impose our democratic institutions on other
peoples. But we do have a responsibility commensurate
with our power and consistent with our interests, to
resist the forcible imposition of totalitarian power, as
we have done in the past in Europe and Korea. [Ref. 32]
In the Angolan situation, say conservatives,
"American foreign policy was severely handicapped by a
residue of guilt over past colonial practices of our major
Western allies." [Ref. 33] This guilt was unfounded, they
claim, and should not have hindered our efforts to counter
the Soviets.
There is no reason why the U.S. should feel any burdens
of guilt about its past role in Africa, which has been
credible. And there is no reason why it should remain
mute while the Soviets use the cover of detente to
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establish a neo-colonialist power base in Southern
Africa. [Ref. 33]
In the conservative image, the rise of Soviet
influence in Africa, which was spurred by intervention into
Angola, was consistent with Soviet expansionist goals. The
lack of U.S. resolve was recognized by the Soviets who
quickly concluded that the Americans would not confront them
in Angola. While Soviet opportunities were enhanced by
local conditions, the factor which contributed most to the
dramatic rise in Soviet influence was the failure of the
U.S. to make it clear that intervention would be made costly
by outlining a confrontational American policy.
2. Liberal
The liberal perception of Soviet involvement in
Angola is consistent with the liberal image of the Soviet
threat presented earlier. Soviet goals did not include a
plan to destabilize Angola. "The collapse of the Portugese
dictatorship in April 1974 had taken both the Russians and
the Americans unawares." [Ref. 34: p. 228.]
The Soviet leadership was surprised by the Portugese
revolution, and it was not prepared with any grand
design that it could apply to the Angolan situation.
Policy, therefore, evolved incrementally in reaction to
the internal dynamics of the conflict as well as to the
courses charted by other external actors. [Ref. 35: p.
121]
In the liberal view, fear as well as opportunism
motivates the Soviets; Soviet expansion is seen as at least
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in part defensive. Escalating Soviet actions, then, could
have partly been the result of U.S. refusal to effectively
pursue diplomatic instruments at its disposal. Jonathan
Steele has noted that the U.S. authorized a grant of
$300,000 to the FNLA only days after the signing of the
Alvor accord [Ref. 34: p. 229]. John Marcum further noted
that once the U.S. had chosen unilateral intervention in
support of ant i- Communist forces the Soviet Union "was left
to draw its own conclusions." [Ref. 36: p. 257.] The U.S.
exacerbated the situation by "forcing" the Soviets to step
up their involvement.
In other circumstances Moscow might have decided to do
nothing. But fear of being outflanked by the United
States and China, and irritation that its long-time
protoge, the MPLA, might lose, probably prompted it to
involve itself more deeply. [Ref. 34: p. 229]
This viewpoint is seconded by Tom Wicker, who claimed that
"the evidence suggests that it was the C.I.A.'s sudden
infusion ... of renewed aid to the FNLA, a C.I. A. client
since the Kennedy administration, that provoked or evoked
the current massive flow of Soviet aid and Cuban troops in
support of the MPLA." [Ref. 37] The Washington Post went
further in its assessment of the U.S. role in complicating
the local situation, claiming that the U.S. had in effect
given South Africa a green light to send troops into Angola.
A January 15, 1976 editorial claimed "that by so using the
C.I. A., the administration made easier a South African
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intervention that otherwise might not have taken place,
while undermining its own attempts . to denounce the
Soviet-Cuban role." [Ref. 38]
Again consistent with the liberal image is the
perception that viewing the Angolan situation solely in an
East-West context distorts the local realities.
. . . it is a fundamental mistake for America to treat
African issues in terms of East-West confrontation . . .
By doing so in Angola, we actually weakened Africa's
ability to resist Soviet intervention. [Ref. 39]
Anthony Lewis further claims that this tendency to confront
the Soviets prevented the U.S. from pursuing more viable
policies
.
When the Portugese gave up power in Angola in 1975, the
United States might have acted diplomatically to prevent
outside interference- -for example by calling on the
Organization of African Unity to arbitrate the internal
conflicts. A public position against all foreign
intervention might have appealed to Africans and
embarrassed the Soviet Union .... Instead, the Ford
administration decided to get into the Angolan conflict,
supporting one side as the Soviets supported the other.
In short, Mr. Kissinger chose Angola as a place to
confront the Soviet Union. The result was a model of
self-inflicted defeat. [Ref. 39]
From the liberal perspective, U.S. credibility was
not at stake in Angola as Kissinger claimed. American
policy which centered on this concern for credibility in
effect pushed the Luanda government closer to the USSR.
The worse the military situation turned, the more Mr.
Kissinger escalated the damage. Against all reason he
cried to the world that America's credibility as leader
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of the West was as stake. He treated the winning
Angolan faction as a hated enemy and Soviet pawn, thus
increasing its dependence on the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 39]
The administration placed itself in a no-win situation in
Angola by claiming U.S. credibility and resolve was at
stake.
The administration only compounds its
discomfiture and the nation's misfortune by continuing
to treat Angola as the crucial forum in which American
"resolve" is being tested. Rather than throwing in new
chips as its situation weakens, the administration ought
to be folding its hand, reducing as much as possible the
damage to its credibility and prestige which a victory
of the Soviet-backed Angolan faction may bring.
[Ref. 40]
For the liberal, then, Angola was not a test of American
resolve, nor were Soviet gains a result of a lack of
American will. Angola was "a story of poor policy
decisions- -taken against considered advice--by Mr. Ford and
Mr. Kissinger, not a failure of American will." [Ref. 41]
As mentioned earlier, a liberal policy would be one
in which the object of U.S. activity should be to eliminate
the circumstances which provide opportunities for the
Soviets. Because confrontation in the Angolan case was
likely to cause escalation, the liberal would propose an
American policy which removed the "justification" for
Angolan reliance on the Soviet Union. Cyrus Vance noted
later that a major thrust of U.S. policy should have been
the removal of South African troops from Angola.
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Removing the threat to Neto's regime in Luanda would
remove the raison d'etre for the Soviet and Cuban
involvement in Angola and would open the door for
normalization of relations between us and Angola.
[Ref. 16: p. 89]
Consistent with this policy is the belief that a refusal to
recognize Angola exacerbated local conditions.
. . . my hope of increasing our leverage in Angola had
disappeared with the administration's decision not to
recognize the Neto government as long as Cuban forces
remained in Angola. Some proponents of this move
believed that U.S. support for the UNITA insurgency in
the south, led by Jonas Savimbi, would provide a way to
drive the Cubans out of Angola. On the contrary, I
believed that the reason the Angolans kept the Cubans in
Angola was because they feared further incursions by
South Africa and South African support of UNITA. I felt
that the solution lay in removing these Angolan concerns
that, in African opinion, legitimized the Soviet and
Cuban presence. [Ref. 16: p. 71]
In. the liberal view, then, "by not recognizing Angola, we
strengthen the forces in that country who are ill disposed
toward the United States." [Ref. 25: p. 187]
In the liberal image Soviet influence rose
dramatically in 1975-76 with the advances into Angola.
However, these advances were the result of local conditions
created by the Portugese withdrawal and the inability of
Angolan factions to reach a lasting compromise. The rise of
Soviet influence was not a failure of U.S. resolve; if
anything, U.S. concern for its credibility exacerbated the
regional situation and eased, or even forced, further Soviet
penetration. [Ref. 9: p. 33]
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VI. THE DEBATE POLARIZES : CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS
The debate within the United States over the trends of
Soviet influence in Africa began to polarize and threat
assessments diverge when Soviet-assisted Cuban troops
supported the radical Ethiopian government against Somalia
in 1977-78.
Within the liberal camp there were two basic groups.
One saw Soviet influence begin to decline with the USSR's
involvement in the Horn and continue to decline right
through to the recent Nkomati and Lusaka accords. The
second liberal group saw Soviet influence continue upward
with involvement in the Horn until the Lancaster House
developments in 1979. This groups perception then converged
with the first liberal group, seeing Soviet influence
decline until the coming to power of President Reagan in
1981. This second group then saw Soviet influence in Africa
as rising until 1982-83, when local conditions, which had
been steadily eroding the Soviet position, overcame the
USSR.
The conservative image of the threat saw Soviet
influence continue to rise until the election of Ronald
Reagan, at which time it began to decline again.
This section will deal with these times of divergence of
threat assessments. Events to be covered will fall
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basically into the period 1977-82 and will include: Soviet
involvement in the Horn; the Katanga invasions; the
developments in Zimbabwe (Lancaster House); the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan; and the election of Ronald Reagan.
A. THE HORN
1. Conservative
Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was seen by the
conservative as the next logical step in a Communist drive
into Africa. The U.S. failure to confront the Soviets in
Angola fostered this move into the Horn. A lack of American
will again permitted the Soviets to make significant gains
toward influencing events in Africa; gains which appeared to
be solidifying into a frightening permanence.
From the conservative viewpoint "Soviet-Cuban
success in Angola unquestionably led to their intervention
in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. And Western
and African immobility in the Angolan affair obviously eased
that decision." [Ref. 9: p. 33]
In the Horn it was again the failure of the U.S. to
act decisively to confront the Soviets which led to their
gains. Initially, said the conservatives, the U.S. could
have stepped in to prevent the radicalization of Ethiopia
which "invited" Soviet advances.
Yet when the Emperor was overthrown, in the "creeping
coup" of 1974 that brought an unknown but incipiently
radical group to power, the United States used little of
its still-considerable influence to affect the direction
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of developments, other than to attempt to save the
Emperor's life. [Ref. 23: p. 195]
This abandonment was the result of the U.S. paralysis
following Vietnam and the situation was further complicated
because the event occurred "during and after the exposure of
the Watergate cover-up, the source of so many foreign policy
problems of this period." [Ref. 23: p. 195]
Again, as in Angola, the conservatives believed that
Soviets saw no real potential of a confrontation with the
U.S. "In Ethiopia, as in Angola, Moscow saw little risk of
military countermoves by the U.S. and believed it could rule
out damage to Soviet-American relations." [Ref. 9: p. 49]
Again the conservatives saw U.S. inaction as
inviting future Soviet adventures.
If Carter fails to stop the Russians, he will be storing
up trouble for himself- -and he will be helping the more
expansionist faction in the Kremlin. The Moscow hawks
certainly argued that U.S. inaction over Angola made it
safe to act in Ethiopia- -and they will now argue that
Carter's inaction over Ethiopia would make it safe to
reach for an even bigger prize the next time. [Ref. 42]
This analysis was supported by Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak, who claimed that
President Carter's difficulty in ending months of
studied inaction has encouraged Communist belief that
the United States will not move to prevent a Soviet
takeover of the Horn of Africa, thereby duplicating the
tragic misunderstanding preceeding the Korean War.
[Ref. 43]
Conservative observers of the situation in the Horn
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also continued to claim that U.S. credibility was at stake
in the region. Soviet successes, they claimed, would
undermine the U.S.'s reputation as a strong and effective
patron.
Does this gritty little war have an importance to the
United States? The answer, unfortunately, is yes, even
though it is a war that the United States had little to
do with and seems unlikely to have much to do with in
the future. For it clearly symbolizes Russian and Cuban
willingness to meddle brazenly in all the trouble spots
of the world. And the success of their Ethiopian
clients will signal to Africa and Middle East strongmen,
both actual and aspirant, that their help can be a
useful thing. [Ref. 44]
The Carter administration was more concerned with
political survival, claimed the conservatives, than with
stopping a Soviet romp through Africa'. - They warned that the
real danger was the
pollyanna advice of political ideologues in the State
Department. They say: Give the Russians enough rope in
Africa and they'll hang themselves . . . Far from
hanging, a continued free hand to the Russians will
place offensive Communist power on the border of Kenya,
and Kenya happens to be the last pro-Western African
state between Sudan in the north and South Africa on the
tip. [Ref. 43]
A weak Carter administration was sending very dangerous
signals to the Soviets. Soviet intervention was a direct
result of the Soviet's assessment "that this President and
this administration can be successfully bullied." [Ref. 45]
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The implications of Soviet activity in the Horn were
clear in the conservative image. The Soviets must be
countered or their appetite would grow.
The United States had better prepare itself, militarily
and psychologically, for the likelihood that Soviet and
Cuban interventionism will start to affect U.S.
interests far more directly that it does in the Horn of
Africa. [Ref. 44]
Perhaps one of the most frightening aspects, in the
conservative image, of Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was
the effectiveness of the Soviets and the apparent potential
for permanence of their influence in the region.
When it comes to takeover of foreign lands outside
Eastern Europe, Russia generally acts as though it were
led by Woody Allen. In place after place, the Soviets
poured in big assets and then goofed so badly they were
expelled . . . But is that going to be the case here in
Ethiopia?. . .The answer, for alot of reasons, is that
the Russians cannot be counted upon to wither away here
they have not made- -or at least they have
minimized- -the kind of mistakes that cost them so dearly
in other countries. [Ref. 46]
The Soviet Union was seen as firmly entrenched in Ethiopia.
The radical government apparently had no other option but to
turn increasingly to the Soviets. "By every analysis,
Mengistu had grown wholly dependent on Soviet, Cuban, and
East German arms. Ethiopia had arguably become at least for
the moment, the first real Soviet satellite in Africa."
[Ref. 23: p. 203]
The conservatives saw the Soviet move into Ethiopia
as a continuation of the upward trend in Soviet influence on
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the continent. Again U.S. resolve was found to be lacking
and American inaction directly resulted in opportunities for
the Soviets.
2. Liberal
The liberal perception of the Soviet threat in
Africa split into two basic positions with the Soviet-Cuban
intervention into the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.
One liberal image, like the conservative, saw the influence
of the Soviets continuing to rise, though this rise was seen
again as a result of local conditions rather that U.S.
actions or inaction. The second liberal camp perceived the
Soviets to be overextended and ineffective, hence their
influence had turned onto a downward trend.
In the first liberal image the Soviet presence in
Ethiopia was a clear indication that Soviet influence was
continuing to rise. Soviet activity was seen, however, as
reactive and opportunistic. It was a combination of local
conditions which provided the opportunity for the Soviet
Union to enhance its position in Ethiopia. The drought and
the heavy-handed policies of Haile Selassie prompted the
overthrow of the Emperor and eased the way for the Soviets.
This image saw Soviet actions as serious, but its
proponents, in keeping with the liberal perspective, would
not support a confrontational policy. As Cyrus Vance said,
"It was not that Soviet actions were unimportant, but I felt
realism required us to deal with those problems in the local
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context in which they had their roots." [Ref. 16: p. 84]
For Vance, a confrontational American policy in this
situation would again place the U.S. in a no-win situation
where its credibility was not really at stake.
By casting the complex Horn situation in East-West
terms, and by setting impossible objectives for U.S.
policy- -elimination of Soviet and Cuban influence in
Ethiopia- -we were creating a perception that we were
defeated .... [Ref. 16: p. 88]
By far the dominant liberal image of Soviet
influence during this time, though, was the perception that
the Soviets had overextended themselves and local conditions
would soon lead to a Russian failure. This liberal camp,
which leans toward the confident liberal image presented
earlier, also noted that other developments on the continent
were complicating the position of the USSR and slowly
eroding Soviet influence.
This liberal image was confident the conditions in
the Horn would place limitations on Soviet influence.
The new Soviet connection must also be seen against
Ethiopia's remarkable past success in protecting its
independence by balancing off the ambitions of would-be
colonial powers. Its special prestige in Africa rests
on this record. If the threat of disintegration were
overcome, any Ethiopian government might move to reduce
dependence on Moscow. Colonel Mengistu already faces
domestic opposition to his reliance on foreigners.
[Ref. 47]
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These liberals also pointed to developments
throughout the continent which seemed to indicate that
Soviet influence was declining.
There has been talk of the new Soviet grip on the Horn
of Africa. But in fact the Russians have been expelled
from Egypt and the Sudan and also from Somalia- -once
their great hope for a major African base. Only in the
unstable regime in Ethiopia do they seem to have a
friend in the Horn, and they find Soviet arms in Eritrea
and Somalia being used against other Soviet arms in
Ethiopia. [Ref. 48]
The continued success of UNITA and the FNLA in
Angola also refuted this "myth" of a Soviet grip on Africa,
claimed the liberals. In August 1977 the Washington Post
claimed that "UNITA exercises control over the Texas-sized
countryside and enjoys broad popular support . . . ."
[Ref. 49]
So much for the "Soviet stronghold" that, in 1975,
American officials claimed Angola would become if the
Congress halted secret support for the anti-Neto forces,
as it did. Without depending on the United States, and
with his nationalist credentials perhaps enhanced for
it, Mr. Savimbi has stayed in the field. And not only
UNITA in the south but FNLA in the north gnaws at the
government's territory and prestige. [Ref. 49]
The liberals also claimed that the Soviets had
suffered a serious reversal in Somalia. "The expulsion of
some 2,500 Soviet advisors and loss of base rights in
Somalia in November 1977 represented another serious setback
to the USSR's position in the Horn of Africa and the Indian
Ocean." [Ref. 50: p. 61] The Soviet switch from Somalia to
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Ethiopia was seen as a very risky move.
By attempting to play both sides in Somalia and
Ethiopia, the Russians lost the one without the
assurance of gaining anything more than further expense
and frustration in the other. The Soviet plan to wrap a
whole group of states on either side of the Red Sea into
a "socialist federation" crashed ignominiously on the
double reef of conflicting Africa ethnic nationalisms
and Arab and Western diplomacy. [Ref . 51]
In Mozambique the liberals saw another chink in Soviet
armor. The Soviets consistently failed to provide adequate
defensive hardware and/or troops to defend against Rhodesian
attacks on guerilla forces retreating into Mozambique. This
showed, in the liberal image, that the Soviet Union was not
an effective patron "in the clutch."
There is a lesson here for American policy-makers- -one
they seem well on the way to learning. We need not be
panicked by every Soviet move on the African chessboard.
Unquestionably, there are situations in which Moscow, by
itself, or by Cuban proxy, can make a difference in a
military situation. But Egypt and recently Somalia and
now perhaps Mozambique have shown that the Russians, for
their own reasons, do not shrink from letting a client
down. [Ref. 52]
The liberals saw Soviet influence declining also as
a simple result of overextension. As Jonathan Power
observed in June 1978, "If Cuba insists on overcommitting
itself and charging around fighting other peoples local
wars, it will dig its own grave." [Ref. 53]
The Cubans are already bogged down in Angola whether the
C.I. A. helps ant i- government movements or not. The
Cubans in Ethiopia have already allied themselves with
one of the cruelest regimes in Africa; if they go into
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Eritrea, they will stumble into their own Vietnam.
[Ref. 53]
The liberal image of the Soviet threat during this
time was also driven by perceptions of Soviet bungling
throughout Africa. While this was not to say that Soviet
meddling was not serious and deserving of attention, the
impression of Russian clumsiness did temper assessments of
the Soviet threat.
In any case, the Soviet involvement in the Horn of
Africa has been notable so far for its ineptitude.
After overarming Somalia, whose designs on
Ethiopian-held territory were no secret, Moscow was
unable to prevent the Somalis from using Soviet
equipment against the new Soviet ally in Ethiopia. For
their helping Ethiopia resist the attack, the Russians
were expelled from Somalia. In Ethiopia, meanwhile, the
Russians acquired some responsibility for an unpromising
military situation in a most unstable political scene.
To turn all this to offensive advantage would be quite a
trick. [Ref. 47]
For the liberal, then, the period of expanding
Soviet involvement in the Horn was perceived in two ways.
The first camp saw Soviet influence growing as a result of
exploitation of regional conditions. The second liberal
camp also recognized an expanded Soviet presence but,
paralleling in some ways the confident liberals discussed
earlier, saw Soviet influence declining as a result of three
factors: the USSR's inability to cope with the complex
situations on the ground in Africa; basic Soviet ineptitude;
and Soviet overextension beyond their capabilities.
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B . ZAIRE
In March 1977 and again in May 1978 forces of Katangan
opponents of President Mobutu Seko of Zaire launched
incursions into the Shaba province (formerly Katanga) from
Angola. Liberal and conservative observers agreed that
these actions apparently occurred with the permission of
Angolan President Neto and were supported by the Soviets and
Cubans. ("U.S. government spokesmen in May 1978, including
President Carter, charged that the USSR was the source for
the weapons and the Cuban for the training of the intruding
Katangese.") [Ref. 9: p. 51] There is, however, disagreement
on how these actions affected the trend of Soviet influence
in Africa. The liberals, again, were split into two camps:
one saw the interventions as alarming and potentially
increasing Soviet influence; the other viewed Soviet-Cuban
complicity as embarrassing and damaging to Communist
influence. The conservative image saw these actions as
consistent with the goals of the USSR and as a boost to
Soviet influence.
1 . Conservative
Conservative perceptions of the Shaba incursions saw Soviet
and Cuban involvement as consistent with Soviet planning.
Soviet actions were not simply opportunistic, but well
thought out. Rothenberg notes that "in the months before
both incursions, Soviet and Angolan media appeared to be
laying the groundwork for preemptive Angolan action against
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Zaire." [Ref. 9: p. 51] In 1977 both Angolan and Soviet
sources began to claim that dissident forces were entering
Angola from Zaire. Before the second incursion in 1978
"Soviet media had carried dispatches about alleged plans or
actions against Angola from Zaire." [Ref. 9: p. 53]
Again the conservatives saw the Communists' actions
to be a result of Soviet perceptions that the U.S. would not
confront them in Zaire.
In calculating its risks, Moscow once more clearly
counted heavily on a United States made gunshy by its
defeat in Vietnam. As Moscow has seen things,
post-Vietnam Units States was wary both of distant and
of far-reaching military involvements, a combination
applicable to all four post-Vietnam crises in Africa:
Angola in 1975-76, the first incursion into Zaire in
1977, the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977-78, and the
second incursion into Zaire in 1978. [Ref. 9: p. 56]
The inability of the U.S. to prepare and execute an
effective response to Soviet action again was seen as
dangerous. The failure of American resolve contributed
directly to Soviet actions and could lead to futufe
activity
.
That helplessness shows that the impact of the Vietnam
war, followed by the C.I. A. investigations, traumatize
Congress today as they did during the 1975 Angolan civil
war. Congress remains transfixed with fear that U.S.
aid will lead to military intervention, and is still
unwilling to use the undercover C.I. A. options. So,
there is no effective response to the invasion of Zaire
. . . This may well (have) agonizing results. [Ref. 54]
U.S. aid to the French and Belgians in transporting
their troops to Zaire was clearly viewed as a step in the
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right direction by the conservatives. But Soviet actions in
Zaire led conservative observers to conclude that the Shaba
incursions were another indication that a lack of U.S.
resolve had prompted a further, more dangerous willingness
on the part of the Soviets to act in Africa. This
willingness translated directly into rising influence.
2 . Liberal
The liberal camp, as described earlier, was split
into two factions over the issue of the Shaba incursions.
The first saw Soviet influence rising because t he situation
was again placed in an East-West context. Local conditions
were providing opportunities for the Soviets. The second
faction saw Soviet influence declining because Moscow's
complicity in Shaba embarrassed the USSR throughout the
Third World.
The first liberal faction recognized that the U.S.
had tangible economic interests in Zaire. However, the
tendency of the U.S. government to overestimate Soviet
capability to threaten those interests, said these liberals,
led to an overall perception of American weakness (and
therefore Soviet strength). The U.S. "precipitated the
usual windy cast igat ion of the Soviet Union and Cuba, which
serves only to expose our own weakness." [Ref. 55]
Again this liberal position saw placing the
situation in an East-West context as damaging to the U.S.
and potentially helpful for the Soviets. Cyrus Vance
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reflected in his memoirs
I wanted the crisis resolved before it provided an
opportunity for Soviet or Cuban meddling in Zaire, which
could turn the affair into an East-West "test of
strength." The Soviets and Cubans present in Angola
would hold most of the cards in that case .... The
strategy I urged to contain the incursion and restore
political stability was to deal with the Shaba invasion
as an African--not an East-West- -problem. [Ref. 16: p.
70]
The second liberal faction saw Soviet-Cuban actions
in Zaire as damaging to overall influence on the continent.
This image also recognized tangible U.S. interests in Zaire
and saw them as being threatened. More importantly, though,
Cuban complicity was severely damaging to Communist
influence.
It would be useful ... to establish the extent of the
Cuban connection with the Shaba rebellion, if only to
destroy the Cubans' pretense that they merely serve the
cause of territorial cohesion at the request of legally
constituted African governments. Their imminent
betrayal of their former friends in Eritrea would also
demonstrate that the Cubans have become puppets of the
Russians. [Ref. 56]
C. FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE
The Lancaster House negotiations which led to the
independence of Zimbabwe marked a convergence of the liberal
consensus concerning the Soviet threat in Africa. This
event was seen as a clear American foreign policy victory
and a severe setback for the Soviet Union. Conservatives,
on the other hand, looked upon the agreement with skepticism
and, fearing that political instability would be an
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inevitable feature of black rule, predicted that the Soviets
would make substantial gains in Zimbabwe.
1. Conservatives
The situation in Zimbabwe, both before and after
independence, was seen by the conservatives as providing
tremendous opportunities for the Soviets. The ability of
the Soviets to make progress in cementing ties with the
Front Line states and their support of Joshua Nkomo led the
conservatives to agree that Soviet influence in the region
was rising, despite the ultimately peaceful resolution of
the independence question.
The conservatives saw earlier gains on the continent
as stimulating the Soviets to press southward. "In the
aftermath of its triumphs in both Angola and Ethiopia,
Moscow set its sights on the ultimate three targets of
southern Africa: Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Republic of
South Africa." [Ref. 9: p. 163]
The harsh tone of statements from Moscow concerning
the white government in Rhodesia convinced the conservatives
that the Soviets were determined to destabilize the whole of
southern Africa. Morris Rothenberg has noted that Pravda 's
assessment was that the Soviet government favored
liquidation of the racist regime in Rhodesia and the
handing over of full power to Zimbabwe in the person of
the Patriotic Front, for the immediate and full
withdrawal of the Republic of South Africa from Namibia
and the handing over of power to SWAPO , the genuine
representative of the people of its country, for the
liquidation of the system of apartheid in the Republic
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of South Africa. [Ref. 9: pp. 176-77]
The refusal of the U.S. to support the "stabilizing" Ian
Smith regime in Rhodesia, then, was contributing to the
further success of the Soviets in Africa.
The conservatives pointed to evidence that the
Soviet Union was committed to a violent solution to the
Rhodesian problem.
To sharpen the West's dilemmas and to maximize its own
leverage, Moscow has consistently emphasized that the
situation in Rhodesia can only be resolved by violence.
This stance has gone hand in hand with the Soviet stress
on the need for total capitulation of the Smith regime
and insistence that the Patriotic Front is the only true
representative of the people of Rhodesia. The point
made from time to time is that the Front had nothing
against negotiations and a peaceful settlement is always
balanced by the charge that Smith's negotiating position
and his military actions can only be met by military
actions on the part of the Front. Whenever negotiations
of any sort were going on whether between Smith and
African leaders or between the Western powers and the
parties, Moscow strongly emphasized that only armed
struggle could bring the desired results. [Ref. 9: p.
178]
This conservative image also pointed to the apparent
Soviet successes in gaining influence with the Front Line
states of Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique as potentially
dangerous is the Rhodesian situation. President Nyrere of
Tanzania dropped all support of UNITA following the MPLA
"victory" and supported the Soviet-Cuban intervention into
Angola. Zambian President Kaunda dropped his opposition to
Soviet involvement in Angola very early on, agreeing with
the OAU decision to recognize the Neto regime in February
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1976 and establishing normal relations in April. The
Soviets were also successful in establishing close ties with
Samora Machel of Mozambique. Soviet President President
Podgorny and Fidel made trips to these countries following
the breakdown of British efforts to negotiate a settlement
on Rhodesia in Geneva in February of 1977. These trips, say
the conservatives, were highly successful.
A major theme in joint statements signed in all these
countries was the alleged armed provocations and
"aggressions" against the front-line states by Rhodesia
and South Africa, charges presumably justifying both
Soviet military aid and armed incursions into Rhodesia,
Namibia, and South Africa from their neighbors.
[Ref. 9: p. 183]
The conservative would agree that the ability of the
U.S. and others to arrive at a peaceful solution to the
Zimbabwean independence question was a disappointment to the
Soviets. However, they would argue, the Soviets were
confident (as were they themselves) that this solution would
not be a lasting one. Even if the agreement did endure,
though, "Moscow probably expected it would retain
considerable leverage by cashing in on its previous ties to
the Patriotic Front, and particularly to the Nkomo faction.
[Ref. 9: p. 198]
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2. Liberal
As stated earlier, developments in Rhodesia brought
the liberals once again into a single mind on the question
of the trend of Soviet influence. There was unanimous
agreement that the situation was a major victory for the
West.
In 1979 and 1980 Soviet policy received an unexpected
blow. Developments in Zimbabwe proved, once again, that
Soviet and allied military supplies and training do not
create political puppets. In the Lancaster House
negotiations leading to Zimbabwean independence, both
Joshua Nkomo (whose ZIPRA forces had received the bulk
of Soviet support) and ZANU's Robert Mugabe followed
their own interests and excluded the Soviets from any
effective direct role. And, whereas the Soviet
expectation had been that a Zimbabwe "of socialist
orientation" would create an entire Soviet- linked zone
across southern Africa, the Mugabe- led government that
resulted from the 1980 election held off for almost a
year before establishing diplomatic ties with Moscow and
has demonstrated a clear preference for Western and
Chinese political and economic links. [Ref. 57: p. 108]
Even prior to the actual independence of Zimbabwe
many liberals believed that Soviet influence in the region
had ebbed. While some believed that a failure to reach a
settlement would lead to Cuban intervention in support of
the Patriotic Front against the Salisbury government, the
majority concluded that the Soviet-backed Cubans had already
overextended themselves. George Ball observed that
such direct Cuban intervention seems to me unlikely.
Cuban troops are already thinly spread over Africa and
are still suffering losses in Angola. And Cuba faces an
awkward choice in Ethiopia where it is being pressed for
help against Eritrean separatists- -an action that would
make a mockery of its commitment to national liberation
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movements . . Thus Cuba seems unlikely to risk
substantial forces in the Rhodesian struggle .... Nor
could it expect direct Soviet military help . ...
[Ref. 58]
These liberals believed that settlement in Rhodesia would
"all but foreclose a direct Cuban- Soviet involvement and an
ever-wider war in southern Africa." [Ref. 59]
The actual independence of Zimbabwe, then, was a
major Western victory and a setback for the Soviets. Andrew
Young noted that "with the independence of Zimbabwe, U.S.
policy toward Africa registered and important achievement
and a new period in African-American relations began."
[Ref. 60: p. 648]
The Zimbabwe settlement must also be recognized as a
victory of the Western alliance in cooperation with the
OAU. It signaled a renewal of the cooperation in
decolonization which came under Western leadership and
via the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s. And
it curtailed at least temporarily the trend toward
growing dependence on Soviet military aid to bring about
African liberation. [Ref. 60: p. 648]
Following independence the Soviet Union was unable
to exert any substantial influence. Relations remained at a
low level and trade was insignificant.
In the three years since independence it has become
abundantly clear that, far from benefiting from its
support for Nkomo and ZAPU, the Soviet Union has little
if any influence in Zimbabwe, and in fact has had to
bear the stigma of backing ZAPU, somewhat as the Ancient
Mariner had the Albatross hung around his neck.
Relations have certainly improved over the three years
78
of independence, but they are far from close. Although
he has indicated his intention to do so, Robert Mugabe
has yet to visit Moscow, and no high-ranking Soviet
delegations have appeared in Harare. [Ref . 61: p. 195]
For the liberal, it is highly unlikely that the
Soviet Union will be able to foster ties with Zimbabwe that
are similar to the USSR's relationship with Mozambique or
Angola. The Soviets have little influence with the Mugabe
government. The success of the Lancaster House negotiations
represented a serious setback to Soviet influence in the
region and brought about a liberal consensus which perceived
a downward trend in overall Soviet influence in Africa.
D. AFGHANISTAN
Following close on the heels of the developments which
would blossom into the Lancaster House negotiations and the
independence of Zimbabwe was the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Liberals perceived Moscow's actions to be
damaging to Soviet influence throughout the Third World.
The conservatives saw yet another example of the failure of
the U.S. government to take firm actions to counter the
rising Soviet threat.
1. Conservatives
The conservatives again saw the invasion of
Afghanistan to be a logical extension of Soviet expansion
following their successes in Africa.
In the Horn of Africa the Russians have recently scored
two big gains and set the stage for a third .... The
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big new push forward came in Afghanistan. [Ref. 62]
Jiri Valenta notes that Soviet actions in Afghanistan are
similar to the interventions in Angola and Ethiopia "in that
the invasion was a dramatic show of Soviet strength in a
Third World country." [Ref. 63: p. 18] The significant
difference, he continues, is that in Afghanistan the Soviets
deployed their own combat troops. This invasion
"reemphasized the Soviet's immense military airlift
capability and their ability to mobilize significant numbers
of troops in a short time." [Ref. 63: p. 18]
Vernon Aspaturian claims that "the Soviet move in
Afghanistan must be linked with earlier and continuing
Soviet/Cuban moves in Africa." [Ref. 63: p. 49] Soviet
gains were "probably more the product of U.S. unwillingness
to support its local clients than of the Kremlin's political
diplomatic engineerings." [Ref. 63: p. 49] The conservative
image again sees the failure of the U.S. to make Soviet
adventurism costly as the primary determinant of Moscow's
course of action. For the conservative "the lesson is that
unchallenged the Soviets may enact this scenario elsewhere."
[Ref. 63: p. 18] Valenta concluded that
The U.S. reaction to the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia, Angola, and Ethiopia was intense but
brief, failing to have long-term or significant impact
on U.S. -Soviet relations. If the reaction to
Afghanistan's invasion is no different, those in the
Soviet leadership who advocate military solutions to
future conflicts will be encouraged. [Ref. 63: p. 19]
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Aspaturian mirrors this conclusion.
The success of the Soviet move into Afghanistan without
a strong U.S. response about future Soviet military
action threatens to create a new dynamic with a momentum
of its own that may excite irresistible temptations for
the Soviet leadership. [Ref. 63: p. 45]
The U.S. must, in this perception, act decisively to prevent
further advances.
So the President has to start doing something. Even
those of us who have been most keen for detente must now
see that unless given some strong warning, the Russians
will talk themselves into the most dangerous of all
positions: the self -intoxicating position of believing
that they can get away with anything. [Ref. 62]
Perhaps the most striking difference between the
conservative and liberal assessments of the developments in
Afghanistan was the predicted reaction of other Third World
nations. While the liberal image, as will be shown, saw the
invasion as harmful to Soviet credibility, the conservative
concluded that U.S. credibility had been severely damaged by
American inaction. The conservative concern was that
America's allies and client states as well as countries
in the Third World and elsewhere may draw similar
conclusions about U.S. intentions and may hesitate to
follow, much less move ahead, of the American lead if
they see the possibility of being abandoned once the
United States decides to resume normal relations with
the Soviet Union. [Ref. 63: p. 31]
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2. Liberal
Liberals saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as very
damaging to Soviet credibility and as a severe blow to
Moscow's ability to exert influence in the Third World.
From the liberal perspective the "Soviet move into
Afghanistan came as a surprise to most American observers."
[Ref. 63: p. 56] There was no step-by-step plan to achieve
hegemony over Southwest Asia; the Soviets were simply able
to exploit local conditions. "If this operation had been
part of a broader design, Moscow would have invented a more
clever scenario and would have chosen a better time of year
to invade." [Ref. 63: p. 65]
While Moscow probably did not expect the U.S. to
become seriously involved, U.S. resolve was not a primary
consideration in Soviet calculations. In fact, from the
liberal perspective the Soviets were in a sense reacting out
of fear.
It is important to remember the historical function of
the encirclement formula in the Stalin era: it signaled
a hostile world abroad, the need for belt- tightening and
vigilance at home, and an assumption of likely conflict
ahead. Nikita Kruschev proudly jettisoned the slogan of
a hostile encirclement in 1957 .... In 1978-79 it
returned .... Given the perspective of a
quadripartite (U.S., China, Japan, and NATO Europe)
encirclement of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan provided
an (admittedly limited) opportunity to break out in the
only direction not covered by the four anti-Soviet
partners. [Ref. 63: p. 62]
The Soviet actions in Afghanistan were seen by the
liberal camp as very costly to Moscow.
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In Afghanistan, the Soviets have ended up with a Vietnam
of their own: The more they pour in, the more they
lose. The Moscow-backed government appears to be on its
last legs, as ant i- communist forces occupy 23 of the
country's 28 provinces. The Russians have lost a costly
gamble. [Ref. 64]
The liberals also saw the Soviet invasion as a
strain on Moscow's relations with other communist states.
The Afghan developments, as well as the exile of
Sakharov to Gorki, intensified tensions between the
Soviet and other communist parties and states. The
reaction of the Spanish and Italian communists was
predictable; the Rumanians were perhaps more outspoken
than Moscow had expected; behind the scenes others,
including the Poles, apparently were far from happy; and
the Cubans seemed understandably embarrassed. [Ref. 63:
p. 67]
As stated earlier, the most significant difference
in conservative and liberal assessments of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan is the interpretation of its affect
on Third World nations. For the liberal, Moscow's actions
obviously alienated the majority of Third World states and
therefore the intervention was a serious blow to Soviet
influence
.
Hostility in the Third World is a reaction that does
concern Moscow. The vote in the United Nations General
Assembly condemning the invasion and the remarkable
consensus at the conference of Islamic states in
Islamabad cannot but have surprised Soviet specialists,
who had the Muslim world safely lined up on their side
against the United States. Some Soviet advocates of the
Afghan invasion are undoubtedly prepared to write this
off as a necessary price--part of the tradeoffs to be
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weighed against the presumed costs of not having
moved- -but others are sure to point to the broken dishes
in the Soviet cupboard of Third World policies as an
unnecessarily heavy price for the Afghan expeditions.
[Ref. 63: pp. 67-68]
In the liberal perception
the invasion of Afghanistan confirmed what a majority of
Third World countries had long suspected, if they had
not said it out loud before. The Soviet Union is a
superpower that has no hesitation in defining its own
security in a way that can threaten the security of its
neighbors.; In Afghanistan it was no longer a force in
support of national liberation but against it.
[Ref. 34: p. 249]
E. THE ELECTION OF REAGAN
The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United
States marked a crucial turning point in American
perceptions of the Soviet threat. The conservative image,
which was grounded in notions of American resolve, saw the
Reagan pre-election rhetoric as a clear indication that the
U.S. would now begin to take concrete steps to reverse the
rising trend of Soviet influence. The liberals were again
divided. One group saw a "cowboy" Reagan who would revive
jingoism and complicate local realities with East-West
overtones. This would provide more opportunities and
"justification" for Soviet involvement in Africa. A second,
smaller group leaned toward the confident liberals and
concluded that Reagan would have little effect on the trends
of Soviet influence; regional realities were so dominant
that R.eagan would neither help nor hinder the Soviets. In
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this view these regional realities would continue to work
against Moscow. Further, there were limitations on Reagan
policy which were inherent in the American system;
limitations which would pull U.S. policy toward a
middle-ground position.
1. Conservatives
For the conservative the election of Ronald Reagan
meant a downturn in Soviet influence. Reagan implied that a
more aggressive U.S. foreign policy was forthcoming. Since
the basis of the conservative assessment of the Soviet
threat is U.S. resolve, the inauguration of Reagan signaled
that a change in the level of Moscow's influence was
imminent
.
The American people elected Reagan overwhelmingly
because they believed he would be able to establish a
more influential and decisive U.S. foreign policy. Thus
the opportunity for positive change is there. [Ref. 65:
p. 28]
Countering the Soviet threat would require that the U.S.
once again adopt a more confrontational stance and develop
the power to contain Soviet expansion. "In electing Ronald
Reagan . . . the American people announced they were
willing- -nay , eager--to begin moving in this direction."
[Ref. 66: p. 25]
It is interesting that even in this time of rising
conservative optimism, discussions of the Soviet threat
still reflect a great deal of suspicion and caution. The
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very nature of the conservative image dictates this. Soviet
leadership is still seen as purposeful and strong.
Some Western leaders may have lost their nerve; in the
Soviet leadership there is no room for hesitation and
world weariness. [Ref. 67: p. 20]
The Soviet Union is still seen as expansive, despite new
U.S. resolve, due to the nature of the communist system.
The Soviet system
drives the Soviet leadership to expand its sphere of
influence wherever opportunities arise. It is perfectly
true that this drive is not as strong as it once was,
and that it does not lead the Soviets into adventures
except by miscalculation. If the drive continues, it is
not because the Russians are so strong, but because the
West, disunited and confused, is even weaker. [Ref. 67:
p. 21]
The Soviet system, then, "will tend to expand through its
own momentum unless faced with determined resistance.
[Ref. 68: p. 37]
In the conservative perception, the Reagan
administration was keenly aware of the nature of the threat
and the American responses necessary to meet this threat:
to restore the military balance; to contain Soviet expansion
and reverse it; to negotiate only from a position of genuine
strength; and, above all, to dispel the psychological
lethargy of America and its allies in dealing with the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 69: p. 527]
Unlike the liberals, who claimed Reagan's harsh
rhetoric would spur the Soviets, the conservatives claimed
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that this show of resolve, backed by concrete action, would
block Soviet influence.
The problem as so far as the Soviet Union is concerned,
then, is not Reagan's "aggressive language" but
America's power. [Ref. 67: p. 21]
For the conservative, a lack of U.S. resolve led to
Soviet gains in the Third World. A failure to take decisive
steps to limit Moscow eroded U.S. credibility. "Action and
inaction contributed to a perceived U.S. unwillingness to
engage its power to protect its vital interests around the
globe." [Ref. 65: p. 33] The election of Ronald Reagan
reversed this trend. In 1981 the Soviet Union faced a new
administration which no longer was weakened by the
post-Vietnam trauma; an administration which was willing and
able to bring about a normalization of relations with Moscow
from a position of strength. [Ref. 68] Although Reagan did
represent a downward trend in Soviet influence, the nature
of the conservative image of the Soviet threat dictated that
the U.S. remain on its guard.
The temptation for the Soviet Union to take advantage of
a critical situation might be reduced if the Russians
knew that any such attempt on their part would be
countered by an American move at a place inconvenient to
the USSR . . . From a position of equal strength and
resolution it may be possible to reach wide agreement
with (the Soviets); from a position of
inferiority- -nothing at all. [Ref. 68: p. 41]
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2. Liberal
The majority of liberals saw the election of Ronald
Reagan as a dangerous step back into the cold war. Those
interested in Africa feared that developments would again be
placed in an East-West context, blurring reality and
nurturing situations where Soviet influence could thrive.
The Reagan administration's policy toward southern Africa
raised two major concerns for the liberal camp. First,
there was a danger that the U.S. would be too closely
identified with the Republic of South Africa, damaging
American relations with other African states.
The U.S. determination to link up with South Africa in
its efforts to destabilize the government (of Angola)
could extract a heavy price in terms of its relations
with the rest of the world, and particularly with the
rest of black Africa .... [Ref . 70]
Seth Singleton noted that a poor relationship
between the U.S. and African nations is precisely what the
Soviets require to cultivate their influence.
Soviet influence is clearly tied to the degree of
dissension between Africans and the West. Without
polarization and continuing armed conflict in the
region, the Soviet Union's political appeal and utility
as an arms supplier and protector withers away. Soviet
operators can take advantage of African disenchantment
with the West but cannot force the pace. They count on
the imperialists to dig their own graves. [Ref. 57: p.
120]
The second major concern the liberals had was that
the U.S. position could be interpreted by the South Africans
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themselves as support for a more aggressive RSA stance.
The United States must avoid the trap of being provoked
into support for an aggressively hegemonic South African
regional policy that furthers the Soviet goal of being
perceived as the primary ally and protector of African
interests. [Ref. 57: p. 121]
Jonathan Steele agreed that Reagan's election sent a
disruptive signal to the South Africans.
Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential
election in the United States prompted a new
aggressiveness in South African policy toward the
front-line states. It stepped up its ground and air
attacks into southern Angola up to two hundred miles
north of the Namibian border. In Mozambique, besides
arming and equipping an antigovernment guerilla
movement, which operated mainly in the northwest of the
country, it sent commandoes on a mission against ANC
representatives in Maputo .... [Ref. 34: p. 239]
A confrontational policy, say the liberals, can only
cause more tension and increase the risk of conflict. "An
approach, in fact, that leads to more frequent and more
violent confrontations, postponing the process of a
negotiated solution, runs a far greater risk of perpetrating
and strengthening the very presences that Washington seeks
to eliminate." [Ref. 71] The Reagan policy provides
"justification" for Soviet presence and places the U.S. in
an awkward situation.
Buoyed by the perceived tilt toward South Africa in the
Reagan administration's policy of "constructive
engagement" . . . Soviet and other communist states are
once again becoming more confident in tone and content.
South African occupation of territory in southern Angola
has provided new justification for the continued
89
presence in that country of Cuban troops ... . Since
1980 the Soviets have engaged in a worldwide campaign to
dispel the imporession that they are the militarist and
imperialist superpower and to pin that onus on the
United States. Despite Afghanistan, this campaign has
been increasingly successful in Europe and Africa.
[Ref. 57: p. 120]
For many liberals, then, Reagan's apparently
single-minded ant i- communism was dangerous and offered
tremendous potential for creating an even worse situation
for the U.S. in Africa.
Unfortunately, the Reagan administration is so enamored
of a chance to fight communism- -even if it means linking
up with South Africa- -that it is ignoring the practical
damage repeal would do, even to its own ant i- communist
interests. [Ref. 70]
Finally, there was also a liberal faction which saw
the Reagan election as disturbing, but believed that Reagan
would have little actual impact for one of two reasons. The
first, which draws heavily on the confident liberal
argument, said that regional conditions were such that the
Soviets would be drawn down despite the opportunities
Reagan's confrontational stance provided. The second
believed that Reagan's rhetoric could not be followed by a
policy which could significantly threaten U.S. interests.
Cyrus Vance claimed that the dynamics of the American policy
prevented the implementation of extreme policies. Referring
to a discussion with Andrei Gromyko , Vance said
I had urged Gromyko not to draw premature conclusions
about the direction of American foreign policy from the
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confrontational posture of the Reagan administration
because there were strong currents of pragmatism at work
that propelled us to the broad middle of the stream,
away from the extremes of Right and Left. I hoped these
forces could draw President Reagan and his advisors from
their preoccupation with ideology and confrontation
toward the main lines of postwar American foreign policy
generally followed by all presidents from Truman to
Carter. [Ref. 16: p. 21]
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VII. THE DEBATE CONVERGES : THE DECLINE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE
There was no specific instance which led to a
convergence of the conservative and liberal threat
assessments, but representative literature does indicate
that somewhere in 1982-83 there was general agreement that
Soviet influence was declining.
The liberal arguments focused mainly on local conditions
and regional developments as limitations on Soviet
activities. The conservatives continued to point to the
success of the confrontational posture of the Reagan
administration, citing, for example, the invasion of Grenada
as firm evidence of the reassertion of American resolve.
A . GRENADA
The United States, along with the Eastern Caribbean
states, invaded the island of Grenada in October 1983,
following the execution of self -proclaimed Marxist Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop by a rival. Conservatives hailed
this action as a victory over Soviet influence. While the
liberals continued to see Soviet influence declining, they
were doubtful that the Grenada invasion was a major factor
in this trend; many in fact saw this military action as a
potential danger to U.S. interests in the Third World.
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1. Conservative
For the conservative, Soviet and Cuban involvement
in Grenada was not essentially the result of opportunities
created by local conditions. Richard Pipes, for example,
recognized that certain conditions, such as poverty, were
problems. However, he said, "I do not deny that poverty is
a problem in 90 percent of the world, but the real problem
is the Soviet Union." [Ref. 24: p. 82] The conservatives
perceived developments in Grenada to be
proof that the Soviet Union is the prime mover of
revolution in this area, and that the real problems are
not social, economic, or even historic, but the result
of a foreign power bent on isolating the United States
and exploiting identifiable instabilities and
animosities to create regimes hostile and dangerous to
American interests. [Ref. 24: p. 82]
The downward trend in Soviet influence was , in the
conservative view, being driven by American resolve and
Grenada clearly indicated Reagan's success. Carol Saivetz
and Sylvia Woodly concluded that "President Reagan's harsh
rhetoric and the invasion of Grenada seem to have made the
USSR wary of new provocative adventures." [Ref. 72: p. 213]
Grenada was another example of the reassertion of American
resolve
.
The final message of Grenada is that after the wrenching
decade of the Vietnam era, the American people are again
prepared to support a vigorous foreign policy that
protects and underscores American interests throughout
the world. [Ref. 24: p. 311]
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The Wall Street Journal claimed in November 1983 that
"whatever the defeatist habits of the foreign policy
establishment, the public response to Grenada shows that the
American people are ready to start winning again."
[Ref. 73]
For the conservative, then, the invasion of Grenada
meant that the Soviets would have to be more cautious in
their adventures
.
In the end, the Soviets were "burnt" once again in
Grenada, and as a consequence, they are apt to be even
more careful in committing themselves in similar
situations, just as other socialist-oriented countries
may have lessened confidence in repeated Soviet
assurances that imperialism cannot reverse the
historical process. [Ref. 24: p. 105]
The U.S.'s ability to successfully counter the Soviets on
the rim of the Caribbean represented a serious blow to
Moscow's interpretation of the "correlation of forces."
Vernon Aspaturian observed that "socialist leaders who
previously experienced optimism with regard to favorable
shifts in the correlation of forces can only feel
pessimistic because of the post-Grenada shift." [Ref. 24:
p. 109]
For the conservative, Grenada had a tremendous
impact on the perceptions of Third World leaders, especially
those who were radical and had ties to the Soviets.
The intervention indicated that Soviet allies outside
the immediate Soviet sphere of influence were not
automatically assured of Moscow's protection, even when
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faced with a mortal challenge from imperialism. These
are troubling implications for Nicaragua, Angola,
Ethiopia, and even Cuba. [Ref. 24: pp. 413-414]
2. Liberal
From the liberal viewpoint Grenada offered potential
for Soviet gains. The invasion was a lesser success than
the conservatives would claim: it was not a clear signal to
the Soviets; it was not likely to deter the Soviets in
Africa; and it could actually encourage instability on the
continent, perhaps strengthening the Soviets' Third World
ties. Fortunately, say the liberals, local conditions were
such that Moscow's influence would continue to decline in
Africa, despite the dangers that Reagan's policies
presented.
The liberals clearly saw the invasion of Grenada as
a lesser success than did the conservatives. The importance
of Grenada was exaggerated by U.S. political leaders
because of "the highly competitive and partisan nature of
(the American) political system." [Ref. 24: p. 282]
The liberals also saw the invasion as a reaction to
a specific set of circumstances rather than as a message to
Moscow. Michael Clough has noted that "in a news conference
on the first day of the operation, Secretary Schultz
emphatically denied that the action was intended as a signal
to the Soviets or Cubans." [Ref. 24: p. 284]
The invasion could also have a destabilizing effect
in Africa, said the liberals. The invasion, they claimed,
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could be viewed positively by the ant i- communist movements,
such as UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique. This
could heighten tensions and, again, provide continued
justification for Soviet and Cuban presence. Clough further
offers that the Soviets might be forced to adopt a more
hard-line stance in Africa out of concern for Moscow's
credibility
.
. . . Soviet leaders are at least as concerned as their
American counterparts with projecting an image of
resolve. Consequently, a predictable Soviet response to
Grenada might be to seek opportunities that would repair
the damage done to the credibility of their position in
the Third World. Paradoxically, the likelihood of such
a response is increased by repeated American claims that
Grenada represented a major defeat for the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 24: p. 286]
Finally, the liberals claimed that the invasion had
the potential for actually strengthening Soviet-Third World
ties .
If states like Ethiopia and Libya believe that
Washington is irreversably committed to their demise (as
conservative rhetoric concerning the principles involved
in the Grenada intervention suggests), their only option
is to prepare for the eventual confrontation.
Inevitably, this will lead to closer military relations
with the only other big power in the neighborhood- -the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 24: p. 290]
Fortunately, claim the liberals, the local realities
in Africa were such that the potential for disaster offered
by the Grenada invasion would not be realized. The Soviets'




Seth Singleton noted in 1984 that the Soviets simply
were unable to provide African friends with the economic
help which would be required to prevent Western inroads.
What the Soviets and their allies have been neither able
nor inclined to provide, even to Mozambique and Angola,
is effective help in rebuilding and developing the
region's war-ravaged economies. Angola's budget is
heavily dependent on oil exports to the United States,
and Mozambique's major source of revenue is South
Africa. The Soviets import almost nothing from southern
Africa and export very little to the region apart from
arms. [Ref. 57: p. 110]
There is no indication, say the liberals, that the
ideological commitment of African allies to the Soviet Union
has grown. "Angolan and Mozambican policies are more rather
than less pragmatic and self-interested after nearly nine
postindependence years of close association with the Soviet
Union and its allies." [Ref. 57: p. Ill]
Both countries actively seek European trade and
investment, maintain close relations with non-Marxist
Front Line states, play key roles in the continental OAU
and the regional Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC), (and) have been
receptive to the efforts of the U.S. and other members
of the five-nation Western "Contact Group" . . .
[Ref. 57: p. Ill]
Further, local conditions are working against the
Soviets in the form of ant i- communist and secessionist
movements. UNITA continues to pester the Soviet-backed
MPLA. In Ethiopia, the Soviets have been unable to contain
the several nationalist movements. Richard Sherman noted
that
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in spite of considerable Soviet and Cuban military aid,
the Ethiopian government has been unable to defeat or
even contain a number of nationalist movements within
its territory, thus jeopardizing an effective, long-term
Soviet presence there. The stalemate between Government
and guerillas undermines the Russian's image as a
strong, decisive actor in Africa. [Ref . 74]
During this period, then, following Reagan's
election and through the invasion of Grenada, both liberals
and conservatives continued to see Soviet influence decline.
The conservatives perceived this decline to be a direct
function of renewed U.S. resolve, as embodied in the Grenada
intervention. The liberals saw Grenada as potentially
harmful, but believed that African realities continued to
hamper the Soviets on the continent.
B. THE ACCORDS OF LUSAKA AND NKOMATI
The conservative and liberal positions appeared to
converge even more closely with the developments surrounding
the non-aggression agreements between South Africa and
Mozambique and Angola. The two camps agreed that these
agreements represented a blow to Soviet influence.
For the conservative the non-aggression pacts presented
a clear dilemma. On one hand the accords were seen as an
obvious victory of the Reagan policy. At the same time
there were arguments that these developments were a signal
that accommodation with pro- Soviet regimes would endanger
ant i- communist elements in Africa.
98
The rapid rapprochement scrambled the chessboard in
southern Africa, and raised concern over whether the
ant i- communist faction in Angola's civil war- -UNITA- -and
a similar group in Mozambique- -MNR- -were about to be
jettisoned by their Western friends. [Ref. 75]
These conservatives saw Reagan policy as simply too soft
The accords, then, were an invitation to disaster.
The peace the Reagan administration has in mind for the
African nations of Angola and Namibia is one that, at
least as presented, surpasseth all understanding. As we
perceive matters, it would leave Angola with a Marxist
government, Namibia with the same, and the
pro-democratic forces in the region scrapping for
whatever they could negotiate, which could end up being
a choice between the firing squad and the crocodile pit.
[Ref. 76]
By and large, however, the conservatives saw the accords
as an indication that Reagan's active policies were
successfully countering the Soviets.
Three years of patient, quite diplomacy by the Reagan
administration are beginning to bear fruit in southern
Africa. If all continues to go as well as it has
recently, the United States soon may be able to claim
that it has blunted and ever reversed the Soviet Union's
southward thrust down the continent of Africa.
[Ref. 77]
Liberals agreed that the Nkomati and Lusaka accords were
obvious steps in the right direction, although they too had
some reservations. Most important was the question of
motives for signing. It seemed clear that Mozambique was in
serious trouble, politically and economically. The liberal
concern was that the Mozambicans, because they entered into
the agreement under duress, would have unrealistically high
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expectations. This meant the stakes would be just as high
in case of failure. The Machel government had already
accepted a political humiliation just in signing the accord
[Ref. 78] a failure to see quick results might cause even
more instability.
The majority, though, saw these accords as extremely
valuable to U.S. interests. In the standard liberal view
Every move toward reducing conflict in the region and
racism in South Africa is in the global interest of the
U.S. It probably doesn't matter whether Mozambique and
Angola see negotiations as an attempt to preserve their
beleaguered revolutionary regimes or as a turn to the
West. The less their need for Soviet arms, the less
their countries will rely on ties to Moscow. [Ref. 79]
The convergence of liberal and conservative perceptions
during this time has one other element that should be noted.
One clear distinction between the two images has been seen
throughout this work: placing situations in an East-West
context. It is interesting that the two perceptions seem to
have drawn even closer together even on this point. The
conservatives appear to have recognized the importance of a
nonideological approach to certain situations. Meanwhile,
liberals also recognized that long-term East-West
consequences would also have to be calculated in any move.
The Chester Crocker policy, for example, left the Cubans the
opportunity to leave Angola claiming success and the Soviets
the chance to draw back, yet leave Marxist regimes standing.
[Ref. 80]
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Those of us who have criticized Reagan for overdoing the
aspect of East-West competition in the Third World need
to pay attention. This tendency has been repeatedly
identified as the element working against local
accommodation. But precisely the explicitness and
credibility of his East-West emphasis is what appears to
have brought the South Africans around. [Ref. 80]
The liberal and conservative images of a declining
Soviet threat in Africa were reinforced with the Lusaka and
Nkomati accords. The liberals continued to see the threat
as a function of local conditions. The conservative
continued to see the threat as basically determined by the
level of U.S. resolve. But while there are still obvious
differences in their assessments, it seems that these two
images began to converge even more closely during this time.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
There are a myriad of American assessments of the Soviet
threat in Africa. These assessments vary widely in tone and
composition. This work has been an attempt to examine some
of the images of the Soviet threat which are most widely
held in the United States. While it is impossible to
completely and clearly define and label these threat
assessments, it can be shown that some broad categorizations
can be accomplished. This work has been concerned with four
such major categories: the alarmist, the conservative, the
liberal, and the confident liberal. It has shown that the
alarmist and confident liberal assessments assume, over
time, a constancy in the level of the threat the Soviet
Union poses to the United States in Africa. These two
images, therefore, have not been examined in the light of
actual events'. The conservative and liberal images, on the
other hand, can be shown to have changed throughout the ten
year period 1975-1985, sometimes dramatically.
To conclude this work, brief summaries of the changes in
assessments will be presented, along with the prospects for




In the conservative image Moscow's involvement in Angola
was consistent with Soviet goals and was a clear indication
that Soviet influence was rising dramatically. The USSR's
actions in Ethiopia were seen as the next logical step in a
communist drive into Africa. Evidence that the Soviets and
Cubans may have been involved in the two incursions into
Zaire from Angola by Katangan secessionists led the
conservatives to conclude that the Soviets were firmly and
confidently entrenched in Africa. Soviet influence was
continuously growing and a lack of U.S. resolve encouraged
Moscow. The developments surrounding the independence of
Zimbabwe, said the conservatives, provided many
opportunities for the Soviets to exert influence in Harare.
Outside the continent, the invasion of Afghanistan was seen
as a logical extension of Soviet expansion following
successes in Africa. Throughout this period, then, the
conservatives saw Soviet influence in Africa rising sharply.
The election of Ronald Reagan marked a dramatic shift in
conservative assessments of the Soviet threat. Reagan, it
was believed, would bring about a reassertion of American
resolve. This was the key to countering Soviet influence.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada was seen as a clear indication
that an active, confrontational American foreign policy
could stem the tide of communism. Finally, developments in
southern Africa (the Nkomati and Lusaka accords) were
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perceived to be further setbacks for the Soviets.
The conservative image of the Soviet threat in Africa
during this ten year period was one which perceived Soviet
influence to be rising from 1975 until the election of
Ronald Reagan, at which time the Soviets were successfully
countered and the threat diminished.
B . LIBERAL
The liberal image of the Soviet threat also saw Soviet
involvement in Angola as an indication that Soviet influence
was rising on the continent, albeit for a much different
reason than the conservative. Soviet influence was seen to
be growing as a result of local conditions which provided
opportunities, not due to a failure of the U.S. to confront
the USSR. With the Soviet actions in support of the radical
Mengistu government in Ethiopia, the liberal perception of
the Soviet threat split into two camps.
The first camp saw Soviet influence decline because of
Moscow's ouster from Somalia and overextension of Soviet
capabilities. The second faction saw Soviet involvement in
Ethiopia as another indication that Soviet influence was
rising; again, though, opportunities had been created by
local realities, such as the drought and Haile Selassie's
indifferent domestic policies.
The independence of Zimbabwe was seen by both liberal
factions as a downturn in Soviet influence. The aloofness
of the Mugabe government toward the Soviet Union and the
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ability of the West to achieve a negotiated solution were
setbacks for the Soviets. The invasion of Afghanistan was
seen by both liberal camps as damaging to the Soviet Union's
credibility in the Third World and, again, overextension of
Soviet capabilities.
The election of Reagan brought another split in liberal
assessments. One faction saw Reagan's confrontational
stance as encouraging the RSA to become more aggressive and
creating further instability. Further, identification of
the U.S. with the white South African government was seen as
damaging to the U.S.'s Third World credibility. The second
liberal faction was more confident that local realities were
continuing to limit the Soviets in Africa.
These two assessments again converged somewhere around
1982-83, when the less confident liberals began to agree
that regional realities were indeed placing tremendous
constraints on Soviet influence. The non-aggression pacts
reinforced the notion that Soviet influence was rapidly
declining.
C. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
It is clear that if there are many assessments of such
particular situations, there are bound to be at least as
many predictions of the future.
The alarmist will continue to see Soviet influence as
rapidly climbing. This image could predict no other
outcome, due to the very nature and composition of the
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alarmist threat assessment.
The confident liberal will continue to see local and
international constraints totally overwhelm both the Soviet
Union and the United States. Both superpowers are severely
limited in what they can hope to achieve on the continent.
Any changes in levels of influence are simply temporary and
spurious developments.
There was some evidence that the conservatives were
becoming aware that placing local situations in an East-West
context was misleading and dangerous. The U.S. government's
movement toward Angola and Mozambique seemed to indicate
that this recognition had indeed occured. Recent official
statements and sanctions against Nicaragua, however, have
dispelled these notions. It appears that the conservative
will continue to be driven by ideological notions, despite
evidence to support other approaches.
The liberal seems to be developing more confidence that
local realities will constrain the Soviets. These liberals,
in contrast to the confident liberal image, will continue to
support an active U.S. policy which attempts to solve those
local problems which create opportunities for Soviet
influence
.
It seems clear that if the Accord of Nkomati collapses,
there will be significant reassessments made by both the
liberal and conservative camps. The recent discovery of a
South African military unit in Cabinda also promises to be a
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serious incident with important consequences. Whatever
assessments are made, perceptions of the Soviet threat will
be colored by beliefs about the components discussed in the
methodology. This implies that there will be a certain
consistency in the American images of the Soviet threat in
Africa.
D. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Some very general observations can be made following
this examination of American threat assessments. One of the
most interesting questions raised is "How important is what
the U.S. believes about Soviet influence?" Obviously on one
level it is very important. America clearly appears to have
the power to bring about certain changes in Africa,
especially militarily. Could such a policy move be
legitimized? Clearly American perceptions of the threat
would affect the policy process. But this is simply saying
that American perceptions are important to Americans.
Beyond this level is the question of what Third World
leaders believe. One common and very important mistake
appears to be the transferring of American perceptions onto
African leaders. Is what the U.S. thinks about the Soviets
really important to Machel or Mobutu or Mengistu? It is
these policy-makers and others like them who will ultimately
effect change in Africa. While U.S. opinions may matter to
them, it is a serious mistake to assume that what is
important to the U.S. is important to Africans.
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Americans, whether conservative or liberal, are faced
with dilemmas when assessing the Soviet threat. Liberals
believe that local conditions dominate events, but they
cannot deny that East-West rivalry is a very real factor.
Conservatives, on the other hand, must recognize that local
realities are important, despite their contention that the
East-West competition dominates world events. The task,
then, is to effectively and intelligently balance these
factors in ones own mind in order to develop a coherent
assessment of the Soviet threat. Unfortunately, neither the
conservative nor the liberal seems willing to accept the
merits of the other's arguments.
An examination of the literature evokes another
observation which is not at all startling. It can be shown
that in times when the liberal sees Soviet influence
increasing, he still notes Moscow's weaknesses. This
indicates the underlying optimistic nature of the liberal
assessment. The conservative, conversely, continues to note
Soviet strengths even when he has concluded that Soviet
influence is declining. This points out the basic pessimism
which underlies his assessment. This also highlights
another conservative dilemma. Due to the confrontational
nature of the conservative's policy, he wants to identify
and exploit Soviet weaknesses; yet, because of the very
composition of his threat assessment, he is continually,
cautiously identifying Soviet strengths.
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In sum, the debate between liberal and conservative is
not whether the Soviet threat exists. The questions really
are: how much of a threat is it, where are we threatened,
and how do we cope with this threat?
A recognition of the character and threat of communist
regimes is present on both sides of today's
argument . Casting doubt on the patriotism or wisdom of
citizens who disagree with the policy does not further
the cause of a national consensus. The debate is not
over whether we should or should not prevent further
threats to our interests; it is over how . [Ref. 81]
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